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ARTICLES
FOUND! THE LOST LAWYER
Kirsten Edwards*
NEWSFLASH: FOUND! THE LOST LAWYER IN THE
BASEMENT OF RUTTENBERG HALL
Relief, shock, and confusion reign today in the wake of the surprise
announcement that has rocked the legal academy-the lost lawyer-
statesman has been found. The lost lawyer, one of the legal
profession's most beloved figures, subject of numerous articles and
the world's longest and most eloquent missing persons report-The
Lost Lawyer by Anthony T. Kronman' -was discovered alive and well
in the basement of Yale Law School's Ruttenberg Hall. Dean
Kronman was said to be elated by the news. Although the Dean's
official statement was drowned out by the din of nearby dining hall
construction, the words "magical" and "today is a day for delightful
whimsy" were made out by Knight Fellowship journalists covering the
story. Kronman rushed to the scene, pausing only briefly to ask
directions to the Ruttenberg Hall clinic offices.
Preliminary news reports suggest that the lost (but now found)
lawyer was enjoying a casual lunch with Yale Law School clinical
students, discussing ethical dilemmas arising out of their casework and
recommending possible public interest career options, when she was
discovered by a disoriented law school tour party. An incoming J.D.
* This article was made possible by my two-year presence at Yale Law School. I
would like to thank Dean Tony Kronman, Dean Barbara Safriet and Judy Couture
for their help, guidance and support during my time as an L.L.M. candidate and as
Tutor in Law. The article was inspired and informed by my supervisors in the clinical
faculty at Yale Law School: Brett Dignam, Steve Gunn, Carroll Lucht, Steve Wizner
and, especially, Kathleen Sullivan. I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the
following people who have improved this article immeasurably with their comments
and contributions: Jean Edwards, Christy Fisher. Natalie Klein. Gideon
Parchomovsky, Russ Pearce, Bob Stevens. Kathleen Sullivan, Steve Wizner and
Karen Yau. Finally, I would like to thank Antonio Baretto. Daniel Bonilla, Vladmir
Dubra, Natalie Klein, Nathalia Mendieta, Dafna Nathan, Gideon Parchomovksy,
Ivan Popov, Radoslav Prochazka, Esteban Restrepo, Ralf Sauer, Brian Willen and, of
course, The Core, for their numerous acts of kindness and generosity towards me
which have enriched both my article and, especially. my time at Yale.
1. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession
(1993).
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student, who had recently completed her Ph.D. dissertation entitled
The Lost Lawyer: A Hermeneutic Dialectic of Intractable Solipsism,
suddenly gasped as she recognized and identified the legal academy's
most sorely missed statesman. Official sources are downplaying initial
suggestions that the sighting was a hoax. Suggestions of fraud are
inevitable after the embarrassing publicity incurred when a claimed
sighting of the lost lawyer sitting in Langdell Hall at Harvard Law
School with Elvis Presley, Bigfoot and the Loch Ness Monster was
proved false. That controversial claim occurred only days after
Harvard Law School slumped to third behind Yale and Stanford in
the influential U.S. News and World Report law school rankings. Back
at Ruttenberg Hall, the lawyer-statesman herself seemed bemused by
all the attention, stating: "What do you mean lost? I've been here all
along."
INTRODUCTION
In 1999 I took leave from my position as a law professor in an
Australian law school to spend two years at Yale Law School, first as
a masters student, then as a research associate and tutor of graduate
students. What I discovered was a perplexing, and at times
infuriating, paradox. On the one hand high profile legal scholars and
judges were tearing their hair out in speeches, books and law review
articles about the state of legal education and the legal profession. All
were mourning the rise of materialism in law firms and the dominance
of intense theoretical abstraction in elite law schools. Law students
were seen as less practical, law graduates were seen as less ethical, and
scholars believed that few now viewed law as a true profession, a
noble calling, aimed not just at the pursuit of wealth but also at
helping those in need.
On the other hand, I became completely qnamored of American
clinical legal education. It seemed to me that clinicians in law schools
were doing incredible things towards educating and inspiring students
to be ethical, practically wise and caring professionals. In other
words, clinics seemed to be the only part of the law school turning out
the kind of lawyer that everybody not only wished for, but appeared
to think was lost long ago. Yet, despite these efforts, the contribution
of clinical education seemed to be ignored in these well-publicized
laments. Not that anyone was critical of clinical education, far from it;
but given the shining light of clinics in what appeared to be an
otherwise bleak picture painted of the American legal profession and
academy, I could not understand why they were always assigned a
cameo appearance rather than a starring role.
This article seeks to accomplish two goals. Descriptively, the article
offers a contemporary portrait of elite law schools. It reviews,
admittedly with some degree of humor, the factors that shape elite law
schools and elite law firms. My exposition pays special attention to
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the role of clinical education in the "post-lawyer-as-statesman" era.
Normatively, this article proposes ways in which clinical education can
contribute to shaping the values, ethics and humanity of lawyers.
Specifically, exposure to clinical education can revive many of the
virtues of the "golden age" of the legal profession, such as
commitment to public-interest work, community leadership and
pursuit of the public good. Unfortunately, an obsession with
academic prestige has blinded elite scholars, perhaps willfully, to the
contribution of clinical legal education. In contrast to the prevalent
ideology in elite law schools, this article calls for celebration of clinical
education and recognition of its potential to alleviate serious concerns
about the development of the American legal landscape.
Part I of this article discusses the influential writings of Yale Law
School Dean Anthony Kronman and D.C. Circuit Judge Harry
Edwards on the shortcomings of contemporary legal education,
particularly at elite schools. Part II looks at the factors which shape
the unique composition of current elite law school student bodies and
faculties. It suggests that homogeneity and elitism have become
dominant values in elite law schools today. It looks at how these
values combine with the pressures and temptations facing students
attending elite law schools and seeks to explain why so many enter
law school with the desire to serve the public good and leave instead
working for large private firms where many do "succumb... to...
pervasive materialism. 2
Part III examines how clinical legal education can help to arrest this
trend. That part argues that by giving students strong role models and
a more contextualized legal experience in law school, and by
integrating ethical teaching into their legal training, law schools can
teach students how to adopt and embody the traits of the lawyer-
statesman. Part IV contrasts the potential of clinical legal education
to promote the lawyer-statesman ideal with the solution suggested by
Kronman and Edwards: practical doctrinal scholarship. It questions
why Kronman and Edwards ignore the strong potential of clinical
legal education and suggests that the neglect of clinical education by
the authors is indicative of deeper flaws in their approach.
In examining the approach of Kronman and Edwards, this article
adopts their methodology. Kronman and Edwards do not rely so
much on reams of empirical data as their own feelings-feelings borne
of talking to friends, colleagues and clerks, of observing students and
lawyers and reading the newspaper.3  Thus, in addition to
2. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34,73 (1993).
3. For example, Judge Edwards sent out a survey to all of his former law clerks
and quotes their responses throughout his article. See id. at 41-42. Kronman's liberal
use of newspapers, journals and popular literature about law school can be seen in his
notes section. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 383-415.
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conventional academic literature, this article draws upon the author's
experiences at Yale Law School, those of friends and colleagues at
other elite law schools, and popular books about law schools and legal
education. It is important to remember, however, that Kronman, as
dean of the country's number one law school, and Edwards, as judge
on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, occupy positions in the elite of
American society. When Kronman and Edwards talk about lawyers,
law students, the legal academy and the legal profession, they are not
talking about the profession or legal education as a whole. They are
talking about the elite, and the evidence they advance is drawn from
discussions and experiences with the elite: students in top law schools,
practitioners in Wall Street and D.C. firms, their friends, and, in
Edwards's case, his law clerks.4 When Kronman and Edwards seek
the lost lawyer they are looking for him or her at Harvard and Yale,
not Pepperdine.
I. THE LAMENTS OF KRONMAN AND EDWARDS
In 1993 Anthony Kronman published The Lost Lawyer: Failing
Ideals of the Legal Profession, a book that issued a dire warning:
"[T]he [legal] profession now stands in danger of losing its soul."5 A
year before, Judge Harry Edwards published an article in the
Michigan Law Review stating: "For some time now, I have been
deeply concerned about the growing disjunction between legal
education and the legal profession."6 He entitled the article The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education And The Legal
Profession. Both publications have been enormously influential and
both prompted a flurry of review pieces and replies-the Michigan
Law Review devoted an entire volume to responses to Edwards's
initial piece from a number of prominent legal scholars.7 The
4. According to his acknowledgments, Judge Edwards attended law school at the
University of Michigan, served as a tenured professor of law at Michigan Law School
and Harvard Law School and "[s]ince joining the D.C. Circuit in 1980, he has
continued to teach part-time at various law schools, including Pennsylvania, Harvard,
Duke, Georgetown, Michigan and, most recently, New York University." Edwards,
supra note 2, at 34 n.*. The named schools are all considered elite top ten schools.
The clerks whom Edwards cites frequently were also the very top graduates of elite
law schools:
Thirty former law clerks (who served with me during the 1980-1981 through
the 1990-1991 court terms) responded, in some detail. They are a varied
group, having graduated from ten different law schools: Berkeley, Boston
University, Buffalo, Duke, Georgetown, Harvard, Michigan, NYU,
Stanford, and Yale. Nearly every one finished law school at or near the top
of his or her class; 16 were Supreme Court clerks; six were law review
editors-in-chief; and many have received offers to enter (or serious
invitations to consider) law teaching.
Id. at 42 n.15.
5. Kronman, supra note 1, at 1.
6. Edwards, supra note 2, at 34.
7. See Symposium, Legal Education, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1921 (1993).
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assertions of Kronman and Edwards8 were not only the subject of
numerous academic inquiries but sparked intense debate in law school
faculty lounges about the state of legal practice and the legal
profession.9
While displaying many differences in style and content, the works
have the same central theme. Kronman and Edwards paint a picture
of an ideal legal professional. Their lawyer is practically wise and
helps hisa" clients arrive at practical solutions and sensible local
results." He is highly ethical, aware of his duties both to serve his
clients zealously and to be a loyal officer of the court. 2 Their lawyer
holds a strong sense of devotion to the law itself and its role in
promoting the public good, accepting without question the need to
perform pro bono work regularly. 3  Kronman calls this ideal
practitioner "the lawyer-statesman."' 4
Both Kronman and Edwards find the lawyer-statesman to be an
endangered, if not extinct, species in a modern legal profession they
find rampantly materialistic, unethical and removed from contributing
to the common good."5 They place the blame for the decline of the
profession primarily at the feet of the legal academy - especially legal
scholarship movements such as law and economics and critical legal
studies. 6 Edwards states: "While the schools are moving toward pure
theory, the firms are moving toward pure commerce, and the middle
ground-ethical practice-has been deserted by both." 7
Kronman and Edwards reason that highly theoretical movements
like law and economics and critical legal studies promote an
instrumentalist view of legal doctrine and reasoning that is lacking in
inherent ideals and moral content. 8 Kronman argues: "Together
8. For the duration of the article, I will refer to Dean Kronman and Judge
Edwards as "Kronman" and "Edwards." This is purely for brevity and is certainly not
intended to imply any lack of respect.
9. While the works of Kronman and Edwards were probably the most influential,
a number of works containing similar themes were published at around the same
time. See, eg., Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the
Legal Profession is Transforming American Society (1994); Sol NI. Linowitz, The
Betrayed Profession: Lawyering at the End of the Twentieth Century (1994).
10. The use of the masculine descriptor here is not accidental -both Edwards and
Kronman describe the lawyer statesman in ways which indicate that he is male.
11. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 2-3; Edwards, supra note 2. at 59.
12. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 14-15, 127, 365; Edwards, supra note 2, at 38,
66-74.
13. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 14, 365; Edwards, supra note 2, at 38, 73.
14. Kronman, supra note 1, at 3.
15. See, eg., Edwards, supra note 2, at 38 ("He or she %vill have gained the
impression that law practice is... grubby, materialistic, and self-interested and %%ill
not understand, in a concrete way, what professional practice means."); see also id. at
68-74.
16. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 4, 167-68; Edwards, supra note 2, at 35,47-48.
17. Edwards, supra note 2, at 34.
18. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 1, at 167 ("Those who embrace the methods of
economics as the best ones for thinking about law and who acquire the intellectual
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these two movements have had a large influence on American legal
scholarship during the past twenty years, and.., both have fostered a
style of thought that depreciates the value of practical wisdom."'9
Kronman and Edwards submit that by removing any notion of moral
content from the law, critical scholarship movements foster disdain,
cynicism and distrust towards the law and legal methods, leading law
students to abandon any notion of a career in law as a noble calling."'
As a result, law students schooled in such critical scholarship develop
moral ambivalence towards legal ethics and pro bono work and
"succumb all the more readily to the pervasive materialism of the law
firms."
21
Both Kronman and Edwards believe that the problem starts, and
therefore the solution must be introduced, at law school. Kronman
states: "However diverse their professional experiences may be in
other respects,... lawyers still share at least one thing in common:
they have all been law students at one time or another, and it is as
students that their professional habits... take shape."22  Edwards
starts his piece with a quote from Felix Frankfurter: "In the last
analysis, the law is what the lawyers are. And the law and the lawyers
are what the law schools make them." 3
The central change that Kronman and Edwards suggest law schools
make is in scholarship. While conceding that law and economics and
other critical legal movements play a valuable role in the academy,
both Kronman and Edwards call for a return to more simple doctrinal
scholarship.24 Edwards writes: "My principal cure for the 'elite' law
habits these methods encourage are therefore likely to be blinded to the value of
practical wisdom and to the conditions of moral life that make the need for it
imperative."); Edwards, supra note 2, at 47-48 (commenting on the impractical nature
of law and economics scholarship).
19. Kronman, supra note 1, at 165.
20. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 167 ("The critical legal studies movement
[has] ... exerted an influence on American law teaching second only to that of law
and economics, [and] has also helped establish the atmosphere of mistrust that...
surrounds the virtue of practical wisdom."); Edwards, supra note 2, at 47 ("At its best,
CLS usefully questions and challenges the political premises that serve as the
foundation of our system of justice; at its worst, CLS is hopelessly destructive because
it aims to disrupt the accepted practice of judges, administrators, and legislators with
no prescriptions for reform."). Dean Garth of Indiana Law School has made a similar
point: "The best post-realist teachers are often masters at showing students that their
most cherished beliefs are simply a matter of opinion or supportable only by some
more or less plausible arguments that could be countered by other more or less
plausible arguments." Bryant G. Garth, Legal Education and Large Law Firms:
Delivering Legality or Solving Problems, 64 Ind. L.J. 433, 440 (1990).
21. Edwards, supra note 2, at 73.
22. Kronman, supra note 1, at 109.
23. Edwards, supra note 2, at 34 (citation omitted).
24. There is a difference in nuance between the authors here. Throughout his
piece Edwards calls directly for practical doctrinal scholarship. See generally id.
Kronman has a broader conception of ideal law teaching and scholarship than just
doctrinal work but continually emphasizes the need for all scholarship and teaching to
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schools' pedagogy is the same as my cure for their scholarship. The
schools must seek a balance of 'practical' and 'impractical'
scholars .... ."I Both Kronman and Edwards submit that if law school
pedagogy and scholarship is directed towards what is practical and
what is "true,' 26 the professional ideals of the lawyer-statesman may
be revitalized.27 Students will realize their calling to serve the needs of
their clients and communities in a competent, ethical and useful
manner and will find a moral anchor in their own devotion to the
law.u
This article is intended as a critique of Kronman and Edwards, but
it adopts most of their central ideals and premises. It agrees that the
lawyer-statesman is a professional ideal that law schools should
promote and develop in their students. It agrees that legal ethics and
pro bono obligations are inadequately taught in law schools and are
sorely lacking in much of the profession. This article also adopts the
idea that changes in legal education can help remedy problems that
exist in the legal profession. The central premise of this article,
however, is that Kronman and Edwards have a misplaced focus on
scholarship. This article suggests reasons, separate from legal
scholarship movements such as critical legal studies and law and
economics, for the dearth of practical wisdom, legal ethics and pro
bono commitment in law schools and the legal profession.
This article also proposes a solution different from the one
suggested by Kronman and Edwards-that of clinical legal education.
Increased investment in, and celebration of, clinical legal education is
the best way to promote the three main attributes of the lawyer-
statesman-practical wisdom, ethical conduct and a commitment to
pro bono activity. This article contrasts the potential of clinical legal
education to promote the lawyer-statesman ideal with the approach
suggested by Kronman and Edwards, and concludes that their
approach is both unrealistic and trapped in the past. Furthermore, it
suggests that the emphasis placed by Kronman and Edwards on
scholarship is not only misplaced but also destructive of the ultimate
goals they seek to promote.
emphasize "practical wisdom." See Kronman, supra note 1. at 265-70, 375-76.
25. Edwards, supra note 2. at 62.
26. Kronman states: "Scholarship... aims at the truth .... [TJhe law teacher's
highest responsibility is to convey a scholarly love of truth to his or her students....
Kronman, supra note 1. at vii.
27. See, e.g., id. at 365 ("One should not despair, therefore, about the possibility of
reviving the legal profession's ethic of public service."), Edwards, supra note 2. at 78
("I have no doubt that, if individual lawyers and legal institutions took
professionalism to heart, the growing disjunction between legal education and
practice would be reversed.").
28. See, e.g., Kronman. supra note 1. at 145-46 ("[T]he more a lawyer values the
well-being of the law, the more likely he is to be able to summon such courage when
needed .... This internal anchorage of his devotion to the law in the good lawyer's
craft gives it a strength and resilience it would not otherwise have.").
2001]
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A plea for clinical legal education might be seen as slightly bizarre,
a combination of stating the obvious and refusing to take yes for an
answer. A number of professors try to limit clinical programs or the
amount of clinic courses students can take-warning against the
dangers of distraction from scholarly pursuits, or a trend towards
trade-school teaching-but most professors happily support clinics.
Certainly few law school deans, especially Kronman, will claim to be
anything but totally supportive of clinical education. Students love it,
and alumni donors both love it and support it generously. But will the
dean know the way to the basement office?
It is true that clinical legal education is highly regarded in elite
schools, provided that it stays within its niche: a haven for self-
selected students with an interest in poverty law and, for those
interested in practice and litigation, an excellent way to build skills by
practicing as a de facto lawyer. This article seeks to broaden the
concept of clinical legal education and to celebrate it. It is not
advancing the idea of a clinical law school, nor even compulsory
involvement in clinical work, but rather an attitude towards clinics
akin to, for example, constitutional law or contracts, which many
schools do not require but which all would strongly encourage
students to take. Of course clinical education will agree with some
students more than others, but so will constitutional law or contracts.
This article argues that given the common ground which exists about
what is wrong with the legal profession and elite education, and the
potential of clinical legal education to ameliorate some of these
problems, it should be taken more seriously-at least as seriously as
the cure advanced by Kronman and Edwards: practical doctrinal
scholarship.
II. PORTRAIT OF A MODERN (ELITE) LAW SCHOOL
A. Composition of the Student Body
Elite law schools are highly expensive and extremely selective. To
gain admission to an elite law school, applicants must be prepared to
pay college and law school tuition fees and devote seven years to full-
time education. They must excel in college (usually a well known and
highly ranked college, often in the Ivy League), 9 and they must
achieve a high score on the Law School Admission Test ("LSAT").
29. For example, in the year 2000 at Yale Law School J.D. students who
graduated from Harvard and Yale dominated the population with 86 and 66 students
respectively (in an overall J.D. student body of 592). Overall, 242 students attended
Ivy League colleges (approximately forty-one percent). Adding elite colleges like
Stanford, Berkeley and Duke brings the percentage to fifty-one percent. Few other
colleges have even ten representatives and most have fewer than three. 96 Bulletin of
Yale University No. 8 (Yale Law School 2000-2001).
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These admission prerequisites strongly influence the socio-
economic composition of elite law school student bodies. Admission
to an elite law school depends in large part on success in high school.
While not officially considered in law school admissions, high school
achievement is relevant to the quality of college attended by a
student, academic and extra-curricular success at that college, and
successful test-taking abilities of a kind reflected in competitive
Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT") and LSAT scores. Yet success in
high school, and later in college, are to a great extent predetermined
by socio-economic factors. These factors include attending a well-
funded school, having the ability to work and interact with staff and
students without the pressure of part-time employment or child care
responsibilities, and living in a low-crime neighborhood conducive to
study, without excessive noise or other distractions. Students with
successful, educated parents, who invest time and energy in their
children's education, assist them with studies, provide tutors and help
with college applications, enjoy a great advantage.)'
Elite law students are also self-selecting. Those who care for
children or elderly relatives part-time cannot hope to obtain the
financial resources necessary to fulfill commitments to their families
and devote sufficient time to their studies. Those from disadvantaged
backgrounds may be intimidated by the size of educational debt
incurred by attending an elite school or may just be intimidated by the
concept of attending an elite law school, assuming they may never fit
in. The focus on recent grades and LSAT scores reduces the
admission rate of students who have taken time off from school to
raise families, care for relatives or pursue alternative careers.
In the absence of reliable empirical data there is a strong likelihood
that most students who attend elite law schools are from comfortably
wealthy, educated, professional homes of the middle and upper class.'
30. For evidence of the startling correlation between parental income and SAT
results, see Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action:
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 988 (1996) ("At over 25% of the
colleges participating in a 1984 validity study conducted by the ETS. the correlation
between SAT scores and family income was larger than the correlation between SAT
scores and freshman grades."). Sturm and Guinier also detail the race, class and
gender biases underlying the SAT and LSAT tests. For a fascinating history of the
class considerations underlying the development of the SAT test, see Nicholas
Lemann, The Big Test: The Secret History of the American Meritocracy (1999).
31. Kronman notes that students from primarily working class backgrounds at
Yale Law School have gone as far as forming an organization. First Generation
Professionals, "to help their members overcome their lack of professional role models
and to promote recruitment at the school." Kronman, supra note 1, at 408 n.57; see
also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.. Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain
Public Defenders, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1239, 1283 (1993) ("Most law school graduates
are white and belong to the upper and middle classes."). Ogletree notes, "For the
1992-1993 academic year, the mean adjusted gross income of parents of Harvard Law
School students receiving loan assistance was $102,088." Id. at 1283 n.174 (citing
Memorandum from the Harvard Law School Financial Aid Office to Charles
2001]
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Anecdotal experience suggests many have been preparing for the
rigors of an Ivy League legal education almost all their lives -
attending prestigious schools such as Andover and Phillips-Exeter
Academy,32 then on to an Ivy League college before going to law
school. 33 This is not to suggest that law students lack interest in the
public good. Many come to law school infused with idealism, some
having performed community service work in high school and college
and many keen to utilize their legal training to achieve public good.
Some commentators have used this fact to place the blame for the
legal profession's lack of public service at the feet of law schools, i.e.:
"they come in desperate to work for the poor and leave desperate to
work for corporate firms. '
This argument, however, ignores the qualities inherent in law
students that can produce such changes without any corrupting efforts
by law schools. By virtue of their socio-economic background, elite
law students are somewhat removed from the realities and hardships
faced day to day by a great number of disenfranchised Americans.
Few will have experienced first hand the daily struggles of
communities to obtain food, medical care and housing, and few will be
fully aware of the extent to which these hardships are prevalent in
society. While wealth does not obviate social conscience, many law
students may entertain ideas of public interest work, but will not have
a burning desire to help borne of constant brutal experience, nor may
they realize the extent to which public interest lawyers are urgently
needed in a community. It is likely that law school students initially
want to go into public interest law because they think it would be an
interesting and rewarding career path that provides the additional
benefit of assisting the community. Such ambitions are inevitably
Ogletree, Assistant Professor 13 (Mar. 11, 1993) (on file at the Harvard Law School
Library)).
32. Phillips-Exeter Academy is the alma mater of Christopher Columbus
Langdell, the man regarded as the founding father of elite law schools. See Arthur E.
Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of Ideas and Men, 1817-1967, at 165
(1967).
33. Many will be following in their parents' footsteps: "About one in five students
at schools such as Harvard and Yale is a child of an alumnus... [and] despite weaker
GPAs, extracurricular activities, and SAT scores, legacy applicants enjoy twice as
great a chance of being admitted to Harvard and Yale and almost three times as great
a chance of being admitted to Princeton." Sturm & Guinier, supra note 30, at 995
n.184 (citing Mark Megalli, So Your Dad Went to Harvard: Now What About the
Lower Board Scores of White Legacies?, J. Blacks Higher Educ. 71, 72 (Spring,
1995)). Not only does Yale Law School select more students from those colleges than
any others but also it explicitly favors children of Yale Law School alumni in the
selection process.
34. This is a paraphrase of the address given by Professor Steven Bright to the
Yale Law School graduating class of 1999. See also Richard D. Kahlenberg, Broken
Contract: A Memoir of Harvard Law School 5 (1992) ("We came to law school
talking about using the law as a vehicle for social change, but when it was time to
decide what we would do with our lives, we fell over each other to work for those law
firms most resistant to change.").
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going to falter if students are presented with other interesting and
rewarding career paths. When interesting and rewarding career paths
are combined with unbelievable temptation in the form of salary and
perks, only an indefatigable desire to serve the public good is likely to
survive.
B. The Faculty
The faculty of elite law schools has also become remarkably
homogeneous. A perusal of the law school bulletins of the top five
schools will reveal tenured faculty with strikingly similar resumes-
attendance at a prestigious Ivy League school, usually with attendant
honors such as Phi Beta Kappa and graduation Summa or Magna
Cum Laude; some post graduate work-often on a prestigious
scholarship at Oxford or Cambridge, or perhaps a Ph.D. in economics
or philosophy; then back to a top five law school where high grades
and law review editorship will lead them to prestigious judicial
clerkships. After clerking, academics will rarely spend more than four
years in legal practice before returning to academia - usually they will
spend their time outside the academy in a "blue chip" law firm or in a
prestigious governmental position.35 Once placed at a law school, the
top-level academic will concentrate on the one thing that vill
guarantee him or her certain success - steady publication in elite law
journals.36
The law faculty of an elite school is made up of diverse
personalities, and a great number of professors do not in fact evidence
the stereotypical disdain for students, innovative teaching methods,
and practical lawyering of which they are often accused. But elite law
professors almost universally share a number of common traits: a lack
of time to develop close, strong and personal relationships with their
students due to class sizes and the time demands of producing regular,
high-quality scholarship; little experience practicing law outside the
35. See Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firn, the Elite
Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 Minn. L Rev. 705,
761 (1998).
36. The link between success at elite law schools and producing scholarship has
become almost a truism; Schiltz states:
Scholarship-particularly highly theoretical scholarship-is "the hallmark of
intellectual worthiness" in the academy. Because "[alcademic prestige
derives almost entirely from one's reputation as a scholar," and because
"academic prestige seems to be the only game in town," the "importance of
scholarship to the careers of law teachers is difficult to overestimate."
Id. at 751 (quoting Paul D. Reingold, Harr' Edwards' Nostalgia, 91 Mich. L. Rev.
1998,2000 (1993); Roger C. Cramton, Denystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 Geo. W. 1,
8 (1986); and John S. Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship or, If the Professor
Must Publish, Must the Profession Perish?, 39 J. Legal Educ. 343, 348 (1989)). Schiltz
goes on to cite nine authorities testifying to the importance of legal scholarship in
tenure decisions. Id.
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academy (usually less than four years);37 a lack of involvement in
community or public interest legal work;" and a healthy, usually well-
deserved, confidence in their own scholarly abilities (a confidence
often extending to an attachment to their own perceptions of the
nature of law and legal reasoning and how law should be taught to
students).
Critiques of full-time academics ensconced in elite law schools are
longstanding and too numerous to mention, except by way of
summary-they are arrogant and remote, they are intellectual to the
point of abstraction, they are too attached to old-fashioned teaching
methods, they ignore teaching to focus on scholarship, and so on. But
it would be foolish to expect wholesale change. The pedigree of its
academics holds many advantages for elite law schools. With the
prestige hierarchy of law schools and law journals well known (now
even codified in U.S. News and World Report's annual survey") and
comfortably stable, a school can ensure it maintains its elite status by
hiring those with the best credentials, most impressive publications,
and finest reputations. Students respond well, conferring credibility
on those who have succeeded at the games they are trying to play.
What budding tennis player would turn down the chance to get tips
from a top ten player? As they compete for scholarships, top grades,
law journal posts, and prestigious clerkships, students are comforted
by the knowledge that their teachers have gone before them and
emerged with flying colors. The primary mission of elite law schools is
to attract the best quality students and the primary mission of top
quality students is to attend the best quality law schools. Law schools
cannot guarantee that they have hired the best teachers, the most
caring professors, and the most wise and ethical role models, nor
could they prove that they had done so, even if they managed to
37. Id. at 761 ("[N]ot a single member of the (huge) Harvard Law School faculty
has practiced in a law firm at even a senior associate level in the last thirty years.").
38. Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law
Students, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2415, 2438 (1999). Rhode notes:
In the AALS law school survey, only about half of the administrators of pro
bono programs agreed that "[m]any of the faculty [at their] school provide
good role models to the students by engaging in uncompensated public-
service work themselves." About one-fifth disagreed and one-third were
unsure. As some administrators added in followup interviews, if they were
ignorant about professors' involvement, most students probably were as
well.
Id. (quoting Richard A. White, Draft: Report on the AALS Survey of Law Schools
and Public Service Programs 42 (1998)).
39. Most law schools are publicly critical of the law school rankings of U.S. News
& World Report. The methodology is attacked by law schools which perform badly,
and the significance of the rankings is downplayed by those schools which perform
well. Despite this, it is well known that the rankings are extremely, and increasingly,
influential to both students and law schools. See, e.g., Paula Gaber, "Just Trying to be
Human in this Place": The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 10 Yale J.L. &
Feminism 165, 173 n.55 (1998); Rhode, supra note 38, at 2440.
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succeed.' But while students and faculty (and university money) are
attracted to a conception of the "best school"-and the criteria for
"best" maintains a degree of consensus-the composition of faculty is
likely to remain.
C. The Temptations
Those who mock law students for "selling out" to corporate firms
often lack understanding of the pressures and temptations law
students face. Seven years of eking out a student existence and three
years of buying expensive law books leave many eager to jump at the
chance to buy "furniture ... not constructed of particle board...
bestsellers before they [come] out in paperback... [and] clothing
made of natural fibers."'" While many students hail from comfortable
or even wealthy families, few will remain unfazed after they have
accumulated a debt of between $50,000 and $100,000.4 - For those who
plan to raise a family and/or buy a house-and the areas where most
elite law graduates will settle and practice, such as New York, Boston
and San Francisco, have phenomenally expensive housing markets-it
is almost impossible to work in traditional public interest jobs which
pay under $50,000, even with a generous loan forgiveness program 3
In the midst of these financial concerns, firms come calling with offers
that make John Grisham's The Fir look cheap.
Starting salaries at New York law firms have escalated, initially to
keep pace with those of Internet start-up companies and now those of
investment banks and management consultants that employ young
40. As Kronman has explained: "[At Yale Law School], the heaviest stress mark is
placed on scholarly achievement.... There are hundreds and hundreds of quality
teachers and only a handful of academic scholars of first rank. This place aims to be a
place of leaders." Jody Feder, To Teach Her Own: Why Teaching Skills Don't Seent
To Matter At Yale Law, 3 Yale Law School Docket No. 2, at 14 (November 2000).
41. Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happ) Healthy and Ethical Member of an
Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 871,925 (1999).
42. To use an anecdotal illustration, I never met one J.D. at Yale Law School who
spent a summer break on vacation - they all work. Every J.D. I have queried about
this phenomenon has replied that loan obligations necessitate summer employment.
For a more scholarly discussion of the impact of law school loans, see Lewis A.
Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry Into the Legal
Profession: The Role of Race, Gender, and Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L Rev. 829
(1995).
43. Some law schools offer loan forgiveness programs whereby students are not
required to pay, or have to repay less of, their law school loans if they earn under a
certain amount and/or work in certain public interest jobs. In 1991 Yale Law School
was forgiving loans to students earning less than $28,000. In the same year, the
starting salaries of corporate firms were around $90,000. Although many starting
salaries are now in excess of $120,000, the threshold for forgiveness of entire annual
loan obligations at Yale Law School has only increased to $39,000. Yale Law School:
Tuition, Expenses, Financial Aid, and Loan Forgiveness (2001-02). available at
http://www.lav.yale.edu/ylsladmis-jdtuition.htm. Students earning over $39,000 per
year are "expected to contribute 25 per cent of their incomes in excess of that amount
toward repayment." Id.
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law graduates. 4 A first-year associate from an elite law school can
earn between $110,000 and $200,000 per year (more than a newly
appointed Federal Court judge). Additional sweeteners such as
guaranteed three-year bonuses of $50,000, or even yearly bonuses of
up to $100,000, are the subject of endless discussions at law schools, as
are perks such as free massages, gymnasiums that press clothes and
shine shoes while employees work out with provided gym gear, town
cars that ferry employees to work and home on call, and free
restaurant meals brought directly to the office. Many New York firms
no longer even require employees to wear suits, having moved to
casual clothes all year round, again to compete with Internet
companies.
After seven to ten years of higher education, students are offered
the professional respect that they crave. Interviewees are told of the
multi-million dollar deals they can work on, the business leaders and
industry captains they will work alongside. Associates, and especially
partners, of large law firms enjoy enormous prestige and status within
elite social circles of the major cities. Best of all, students do not need
to seek out these opportunities; they do not even need to apply. Law
firms come to elite law schools practically begging students to sign up.
Students are flown across the country to interview for firms in cities
ranging from Denver, San Francisco and Los Angeles to Chicago,
Boston and New York, a phenomenon described by former Yale Law
School student Chris Goodrich in a book chapter aptly titled "Pigs in
Space."45 After a law school experience where some students feel they
"have been treated as incompetents, terrorized daily, excluded from
privilege, had their valued beliefs ridiculed, and in general felt their
sense of self-worth thoroughly demeaned,"46 they are flattered and
cajoled, wined and dined, and keenly sought after.
At least as important as money in the big firm job frenzy is the
operation of another self-selecting trait of almost all elite law school
students: competitiveness.47 Elite students have become addicted to
44. See David Leonhardt, Law Firms Rushed to Raise Salaries to Stem an Exodus
to Start-ups. Now the Bill is Coming Due, N.Y. Times, May 22, 2000, at C4; see also
David Leonhardt, Law Firms Pay Soars to Stem Dot-Com Defections, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 2, 2000, at Al.
45. Chris Goodrich, Anarchy and Elegance: Confessions of a Journalist at Yale
Law School 125 (1991). A 1999 Yale Law Revue skit joked about the fabrications
students used in interview programs to convince firms (and perhaps themselves) that
they were interested in West Coast firms, exploiting their interest to get an interview
and thus a free trip to the West Coast.
46. Scott Turow, One L (1977), quoted in "Atticus Falcon," Planet Law School:
What You Need to Know (Before You Go) ... but Didn't Know to Ask 286 (1998).
47. Schiltz notes:
First they competed to get into a prestigious college. Then they competed
for college grades. Then they competed for LSAT scores. Then they
competed to get into a prestigious law school. Then they competed for law
school grades. Then they competed to make the law review. Then they
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the spoils of their academic victories, and the significance of the
"cocktail party factor" is impossible to discount. As one Harvard Law
School graduate put it, "After years of savoring other people's
reactions when you said you were at Princeton College [sic] or
Harvard Law School, it was tough to contemplate the reaction to your
declaration 'I'm a legal-services lawyer."' "  Continual hard-won
success in high school, college and law school conditions many law
students to have an almost Pavlovian response to a competitive
challenge. Getting a job at the biggest, best and highest paying firm
soon becomes another flaming hoop for the law student to jump
through.49
Of course large firms exact their pound of flesh by expecting
associates to work extraordinary hours." Students will admit to being
well-informed of the horror stories of long hours, high pressure and
arduous work at high-profile firms, but their first-hand experience will
be otherxvise. Almost all elite law students undertake full-time
employment as summer associates after their second year of law
school. A summer associateship is an ideal opportunity-even for
those students firmly committed to participating in public interest
work. Idealistic students tell themselves they can experience the
horror of firm life and get it out of their system. After all, it is only for
the summer-they are not so much selling their souls as briefly renting
them out. For noncommittal students, the time allows them to
evaluate firm life and practice without sacrificing the critical career
goal of "keeping their options open," and all with a salary well in
excess of what is needed to pay off crushing student loans.51
Once at the firm, students are hard pressed to find the horrors
about which they have heard. Summer associates rarely work longer
competed for clerkships. Then they competed to get hired by a big law firm.
Schiltz, supra note 41, at 905.
48. See Kahlenberg, supra note 34, at 7 ("1 came to learn that in the legal
profession it was infinitely more important to be respectable than to be admirable and
that salary replaced grades as the badge of merit and achievement.").
49. Students also complain of the practical difficulty in trying to forge another
path:
Identifying job opportunities with small firms, the government, and public
interest groups is difficult, as they do not interview on law school campuses
or advertise in major trade journals. Also, unlike big firms, they usually
cannot hire a year in advance. It takes a lot of guts to hold out for a small
firm, government, or public interest job during the third year of law school,
as one of your friends after another signs up with a big firm.
Schiltz, supra note 41, at 941.
50. Dennis Curtis, Can Law Schools and Big Law Firms Be Friends?, 74 S. Cal. L
Rev. 65, 74 n.14 (2000) ("At the biggest firms in the biggest cities, associates and
partners commonly bill 2,000 to 2,500 hours per year").
51. Professor Harold Koh of Yale Law School argues that most elite law students
choose their career by the following questions: "What job vill most impress others;
what job will help me pay off my loans, and what jobs will keep my options open."
Obviously a summer associateship at a blue chip firm is three for three.
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than nine to five, are given the best, most interesting work (often pro
bono cases), are assigned the nicest partners, and are treated with kid
gloves by firm employees. They are wined and dined constantly in
five-star restaurants, 2 provided with baseball and tennis tickets
(prime seats, of course), and encouraged to attend bonding activities
such as horseback riding and whitewater rafting-even water pistol
fights with partners. Many attend parties at partners' sumptuous
mansions or on their huge yachts-the subtext of "all this could be
yours" barely disguised.53 For these travails, summer associates are
paid between $2,200 and $2,500 per week. Students claim to be well
aware that "summers" see a deceptively rosy picture of firm life. But
as the evidence suggests, even the most public spirited tend to return
to the devil they know when offered a secure and prestigious position
in a familiar environment with seemingly friendly faces and an
52. Most law firms will pick up the bill for lunch or dinner if a summer associate
attends the meal. "Summers" are thus highly sought after dining companions by firm
associates during their stay.
53. Schiltz provides a wonderfully detailed example of this:
During your first month working [as a summer associate] at the big firm,
some senior partner will invite you and the other new associates to a
barbeque at his home. This 'barbeque' will bear absolutely no relationship
to what your father used to do on a Weber grill in your driveway. You will
drive up to the senior partner's home in your rusted Escort and park at the
end of a long line of Mercedeses and BMWs and sports utility vehicles. You
will walk up to the front door of the house. The house will be enormous.
The lawn will look like a putting green; it will be bordered by perfectly
manicured trees and flowers. Somebody wearing a white shirt and black
bow tie will answer the door and direct you to the backyard. You will walk
through one room after another, each of which will be decorated with
expensive carpeting and expensive wallpaper and expensive antiques.
Scattered throughout the home will be large professional photographs of
beautiful children with tousled, sun-bleached hair.
As you enter the partner's immaculately landscaped backyard, someone
wearing a white shirt and black bow tie carrying a silver platter will approach
you and offer you an appetizer. Don't look for cocktail weenies in barbeque
sauce; you will more likely be offered pAt6 or miniature quiches or shrimp.
A bar will be set up near the house; the bartender (who will be wearing a
white shirt and black bow tie, of course) will pour you a drink of the most
expensive brand of whatever liquor you like. In the corner of the yard, a
caterer will be grilling swordfish. In another comer will stand the senior
partner, sipping a glass of white wine, holding court with a worshipful group
of junior partners and senior associates.
The senior partner will be wearing designer sunglasses and designer
clothes; the logo on his shirt will signal its exorbitant cost; his shorts will be
pressed. He will have a tan-albeit a slightly orange, tanning salon
enhanced tan-and the nicest haircut you've ever seen. Eventually, the
partner will introduce you to his wife. She will be beautiful, very thin, and a
lot younger than her husband. She, too, will have a great tan, and not nearly
as orange as her husband's. You and the other lawyers will talk about golf.
Or about tennis. After a couple hours, you will walk out the front door,
slightly tipsy from the free liquor, and say to yourself, "This is the life."
Schiltz. supra note 41, at 912-13.
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enormous paycheck-all before finishing law school and without so
much as writing a cover letter.
Many believe that in choosing the corporate firm option students
receive tacit or even explicit encouragement from the faculty. Some
professors encourage students to try working at a firm (like they did)
for a few years to benefit from the training the firms provide and to
evaluate the experience. Other professors suggest that the work
performed by large firms is the most genuine and intellectually
challenging.' 4 Some commentators argue that law schools push their
graduates towards large law firms by a more subconscious process:
"To students, usually possessed of extremely talented minds and
competitive personalities, law schools send a message about values.
That message is that the path to success-the way to "win'-is to get a
job with a large law firm."55
D. The Practice of Law: Golden Handcuffs Versus Psychic Income
One could be forgiven, on the strength of recent literature on the
subject, for thinking that once a law student joins a large elite law firm
her life is ruined forever. Kronman's and Edwards's descriptions of a
legal profession that is rapacious, soulless and driven solely by greed
are supplemented by those who present a devastating portrait of the
personal life of a corporate lawyer. Influential popular literature,
including Double Billing, 6 Cameron Stracher's best-selling semi-
autobiographical novel about a Harvard Law graduate at a large New
York firm, and Who's Killing the Great Lawyers of Harvard,7 a recent
Esquire magazine article, portray a corporate law firm world
populated by obsessively driven and critical partners overseeing
exploited and overworked associates. Unhappy with work and life,
and increasingly dysfunctional in the larger world, lawyers feel unable
to leave, shackled by "golden handcuffs"-the money and prestige
which lured them into practice. Alcoholism, divorce and misery are
common and many associates are apparently suicidal, or at least on
the verge of a major breakdown.
In many ways these images are as destructive as the myths that lure
elite law graduates to corporate firms in the first place. When law
graduates become aware that many law firms are in fact populated
54. See Henry Rose, Law Schools are Failing to Teach Students to Do Good, Chi.
Trib., Jul. 11, 1990, at 17 ("The subliminal message of [law school] training is clear to
most students: 'Real' lawyers work in large firms representing corporate and affluent
clients.").
55. Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, Keynote Address, in The MacCrate Report:
Building the Educational Continuum 4, 13 (Joan S. Howland & William H. Lindberg
eds., 1994).
56. Cameron Stracher, Double Billing (1998).
57. Robert Kurson, Who's Killing the Great Lawyers of Harvard, Esquire, Aug.
2000. at 82.
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with decent hardworking people, who apparently have outside
interests, healthy family lives, a compassionate attitude toward the
poor and a commitment to social justice, they dismiss the literature as
mythical, perhaps prompted by academic jealousy of corporate
glamour, income and prestige.5 8
Similar divisions arise about the place of pro bono and public
interest work at firms. Elite law students interested in firm work have
become weary of pious peers' accusations of being "sellouts," "yuppie
scum," or victims of "the great corporate suck,"5 9 and many argue that
it is simplistic to present a dichotomy of public interest: good,
corporate firm: bad.0 Some student groups have identified firms
which are "family friendly" or committed to pro bono activity and
encourage students to make these issues a priority in interview
questioning and when choosing a firm. In response to student
demand, a number of firms have showcased a range of pro bono
opportunities and allowed students to split their summers61 with public
interest or government organizations. Idealistic students argue that
they will not be corrupted by firm life. They commit themselves to
changing the firm culture from the inside or using the money they are
paid to make charitable contributions or fund personal public interest
projects in the future. Other students are less quixotic but defend
their choice on the basis that they are advancing corporate prosperity
for the good of the entire nation.
But while critics of firm life and practice may have overstated their
case, even commentators who have built careers on deflating powerful
myths and images about the evils of the legal profession 61 concede that
some emerging facts about corporate professional life are too
disturbing to dismiss. The suicide rate among white male lawyers is
twice that of the general population.63 Falcon warns prospective law
students:
58. See, e.g., John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers and their Discontents: Findings from a
Survey of the Chicago Bar, 74 Ind. L.J. 735, 757 (1999) ("Law professors may find
comfort in believing that practicing lawyers are unhappy [because they may] feel
better about their perceived (if not real) financial sacrifice.").
59. These quotes are from conversations the author has participated in,
overheard, or seen posted on The Wall (a public discussion space) at Yale Law
School.
60. See Charles Silver & Frank B. Cross, What's Not To Like About Being a
Lawyer? 109 Yale L.J. 1443, 1449-66 (2000) (reviewing Arthur L. Liman, Lawyer: A
Life of Counsel and Controversy (1998)).
61. A number of firms will even pay a student's salary for the entire summer
period although the student will spend only half the summer working for the firm and
the other half for a public interest organization.
62 See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The
Transformation of the Big Law Firm (1991); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape
of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our
Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4, 5 (1983); Silver &
Cross. supra note 60, at 1492.
63. Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1476 n.197.
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[Y]ou won't hear (until after you've become a lawyer) that the rate
of clinical depression among lawyers is four times that of the general
population, that the rate of alcohol and drug addiction is higher for
attorneys-especially trial attorneys-than for any other profession.
(Various surveys show that it's perhaps as high as 60%.).,
Other statistics show that lawyers are more likely to divorce and never
remarry, and to suffer from stress-related health problems like ulcers,
heart disease and, in pregnant women, miscarriages. -5 These statistics
are across all attorneys, but anecdotal accounts and some recent
research suggest the corporate firm population is the most blighted.
A Michigan Law School survey of the classes of 1990 and 1991 five
years after graduation discovered, consistent with findings in similar
surveys, that the highest earning private practitioners reported the
lowest level of job satisfaction. Law professors and public interest
attorneys derived the most "psychic income" from their work but
"lawyers in all other types of practice f[ou]nd their work intrinsically
more satisfying than their counterparts in large private practices-
sometimes considerably more satisfying. "' Surveys by journals, bar
associations and newspapers note that large firms are being forced to
develop financial incentives to prevent young associates from leaving
in droves, and even partners are reported to be miserable.'
The principal culprit for corporate malaise is one fact that seems
uncontested: lawyers in large prestigious firms are working longer
hours than ever before. As Kronman argues, "the lengthening of the
working day at large firms across the country is a remarkable
phenomenon and must be counted among the most significant
changes that have taken place in recent years in the nature of large-
firm practice."'  From this phenomenon it is possible to draw more
64. Falcon, supra note 46, at 301. Other estimates are more conservative but still
alarming. See, e.g., Getting Better, L Magazine: Life-Liberty-Law School, Feb. 2001, at
12 ("The American Bar Association Commission on Lawyer Assistance Programs...
estimates that while 10 percent of the general population has problems with alcohol
abuse, anywhere from 15 to 18 percent of the lawyer population suffers from the same
problem.").
65. Schiltz, supra note 41, at 880.
66. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, The Fruits of Our
Labors: An Empirical Study of the Distribution of Income and Job Satisfaction Across
the Legal Profession, 49 J. Legal Educ. 342,362 (1999).
67. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like A Lawver, Work Like A Machine
The Dissonance Between Law School And Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L Rev. 1231, 1231-
32 (1991) (describing young associates' complaints of dissatisfaction at law firms);
Schiltz, supra note 41, at 888 ("Indeed '[h]appy law partners are a small minority
these days."' (quoting Is it Possible to Put Passion Back into Practice of Law?,
Partner's Rep., Nov. 1994, at 1)); Seth Oltman. Attrition Condition, L Magazine: Life-
Liberty-Law School, Nov./Dec. 2000, at 37 (noting that a National Association for
Law Placement study of nearly 5500 lawyers from the classes of 1991 to 1998 found
that 38.3% of associates leave by their third year and 59.6% by the end of their fifth
year).
68. Kronman, supra note 1, at 281-82.
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controversial, but entirely logical, conclusions about the changing
nature of firm practice.
It would appear that lawyers in large firms (those where elite law
students dominate) are performing less pro bono work than before. A
recent New York Times article noted that large New York firm pro
bono commitments have dropped considerably, dipping below the
professions own guidelines, despite record profits and booming
business.6 9 There is no evidence that firm employees care any less
about the poor; in fact there is increasing evidence that more students
include pro bono opportunities in their criteria when choosing firms,
that firms are getting better at publicizing pro bono opportunities, and
that performing a lot of pro bono work is not considered an
impediment to partnership chances.7" But good intentions dissipate
quickly under the external pressures of a competitive environment
and radically higher billing expectations,71 and the internal pressures
placed by associates on themselves to merit their own, arguably
excessive, salaries. Pro bono work ends up being last on a long list of
priorities. For an overworked young associate it is "pro bono or go
home-o.
' 72
The billing-oriented culture at corporate law firms also has an
impact on the quality of training given to young associates. Many
would argue that the "apprenticeship system" for which the elite firms
were previously renowned has begun to deteriorate.73  Senior
attorneys simply do not have as much time to devote to mentoring as
they once had. It is perhaps no coincidence that during the current
period of decline in mentoring, there has been a concomitant increase
in complaints about the ethical conduct of attorneys.74 Whether
lawyers, especially those in firms, behave less ethically than before is
subject to debate.75 It is beyond dispute, however, that complaints
69. Greg Winter, Legal Firms Cutting Back on Free Services for Poor, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 17, 2000, at Al; see also, Stracher, supra note 56, at 51 ("[Slince 1992, according
to The American Lawyer's latest survey, pro bono hours have plunged from about 56
hours per lawyer to 36 hours.").
70. Esther F. Lardent, Pro Bono Work is Good for Business, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 19,
2001, at B20 ("Although there have been no national surveys to date of changes in
attitudes among younger lawyers, anecdotal information and related developments,
such as the increase in law school public service projects and the growth of fellowship
and rotation programs, confirm the heightened interest in pro bono among the
younger generation of attorneys."); see also Stracher, supra note 56, at 51 (noting that
while some law firms had reduced the credit given to associates for pro bono work
and had instigated pro bono minimums, firm associates seem more aware of their pro
bono obligations, and that some firms have reversed restricted policies after an outcry
by associates); Edwards, supra note 2, at 69-71 (noting opinions of former law clerks
on pro bono work).
71. Curtis, supra note 50, at 74 & n.14; Stracher, supra note 56, at 51.
72. Stracher, supra note 56, at 51.
73. Curtis, supra note 50, at 69.
74. Glendon, supra note 9, at 28; see Schiltz, supra note 41, at 908.
75. See Galanter & Palay, supra note 62; Glendon, supra note 9; Silver & Cross,
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have risen and public esteem for the legal profession has suffered-a
fact noted by many prominent figures, not least former Supreme
Court Chief Justice Warren Burger in a well-known address at
Fordham Law School.
76
Placed in a competitive environment where billing is paramount,
and lacking guidance from senior attorneys, the self-image of the elite
student-turned-attorney can begin to suffer. The grand irony is that
those who chose prestigious firms out of a need to feel distinguished
or special come to realize that they are being treated as the opposite.
When files are dumped on their desk without a word of thanks, or
even explanation, or when they overhear a stressed partner bark "get
me a body," few bright young associates feel that their years of
educational achievement and elite law school training are being
adequately recognized or rewarded. Yet, despite all these pressures,
most lawyers will eschew the potential psychic income offered by
different career options and remain in the golden cage. "The
tombstone of many a Wall Street lawyer... is carved with the epitaph
'I kept my options open."'
A common student myth is that it is easy to move from the private
sector to public interest work but that public interest work can
stigmatize a student who might later want to work in the corporate
sphere. In fact, entry into a private firm effectively closes career
options.78 Despite many students going to firms for "two years" to
gain experience, training or funds for future public interest work, once
ensconced the majority will stay. Some will go to prestigious
government agencies or work as United States Attorneys-jobs
considered respectable career stepping stones that do not forfeit a
right to return to private practice. But most of those who leave large
firms will bypass public interest work and go to work for different
firms or large corporations as in-house counsel. Some will just leave
the law altogether.
Richard E. Neustadt, professor at Harvard College, has said, "I
have lost some friends on the Harvard Law faculty by teasing them
about the business I claim they are in: turning many of my public-
spirited undergraduates into cash-hungry corporate attorneys heading
off toward midlife crises! ' 79 Is this truly the business that elite schools
supra note 60, at 1475.
76. Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 Fordham L Rev. 949,
950 (1995).
77. Kahlenberg, supra note 34, at 23 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
78. In fact, the stigma may work the other way. I have been told by some public
interest employers that they are wary of hiring lawyers who have spent time practicing
at a private firm because they are skeptical that the lawyer will cope with the lifestyle
change and salary plunge and doubt if they have sufficient commitment and
dedication to public interest work.
79. Kahlenberg, supra note 34 (testimonial of Professor Richard Neustadt on
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are in? The first part of this article has sought to undermine the myth
that students are fervently committed to public interest law when they
arrive at law school only to be transformed into corporate monsters by
the time they leave. The truth, as always, is somewhere in the middle.
Most elite students are good but privileged people attracted to public
commitment but also drawn by money and prestige. While they may
succumb to the temptation of the big law firms, they do not abandon
all notions of social justice when they make the choice to go to large
private firms. Law firms have shown themselves to be responsive to
students' pro bono interests, but young associates have also proven
vulnerable to external pressures imposed by firm culture and, as a
result, are doing less pro bono work and behaving less ethically (or at
least appearing to). In addition, many of them are unhappy, or at
least unfulfilled, and some, judging by the suicide rate, are even
seriously depressed."
If a law school is going to refute Neustadt's accusation, it must
therefore focus on two goals. The first is to somehow, in the face of
enormous external pressure, increase the number of students who
enter into public interest law in the first place. The second, and
arguably more important, goal is to shape the values and ethics of
those who will not go into public interest work: the majority who will
work for private firms. If elite young lawyers are to stay at firms, what
can be done to increase the level of pro bono work performed within
those firms, to keep lawyers mindful of the need for public service
work, and to increase the likelihood that they move in and out of
public interest work in the manner of old "lawyer-statesmen" like
Arthur Liman?" Furthermore, how can law school act to ensure more
ethical practice and responsible conduct while lawyers are working
within the firm; and how can they guide students towards a humane
self-understanding that may insulate them from the more dramatic
adverse affects of the stress, pressure and hard work they will
encounter? The next section discusses how clinical legal education
can contribute to meeting these challenges.
book jacket).
80. Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1476.
81. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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III. WHAT CAN CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION Do?"
A. Role Models
It is well-known that effective role models greatly increase the
chance that students will follow certain career paths. This is especially
true when students need to resist a powerful dominant culture in
order to pursue their goals. The lack of public interest role models
within elite faculties has already been noted, but not all law
professors in elite faculties push their students towards corporate
work; in fact, a number of them regularly attempt the opposite and
publicly proselytize the work performed by public interest advocates.
The problem is that professors face a large impediment in
encouraging students to enter public interest fields: the credibility
gap. Student responses range from amused skepticism to indignation
when professors who clerked for the Supreme Court before putting in
time at a prestigious law firm exhort the rewards of undertaking legal
service work immediately after law school and "poo-poo" students'
yearning for prestige. Some star faculty members will take on many
pro-bono projects, but students are well aware that their own public
interest enterprises, whether performed during law school or while
working at a firm, are unlikely to merit a television appearance, book
deal or their picture on the front page of The New York Times.
Clinical law professors stand before students as people who have
genuinely taken a different road and not only survived but flourished.
Performing public interest work with an admired and respected
professional can inspire students to previously unimagined career
paths. Unlike the law professors who extol the virtues of law firm life,
many clinical professors actively discourage firm careers, citing long
hours, tedious work and the decline in human spirit and imagination
they have observed in previous students now working at firms.
Furthermore, clinical professors offer students more than just vague
encouragement to assist the community. Clinical professors are a
resource for students who are interested in public interest work but do
not know where or how to begin. Because they have moved in circles
different from the mainstream faculty, they can share their
82. This article does assume some knowledge of what clinical legal education is: a
program which allows law students to work with real clients as junior law yers under
the supervision of experienced clinical faculty. This article also confines its discussion
to the traditional domain of clinics: poverty lawyering and related work in areas such
as disabilities, criminal legal assistance, capital punishment, landlord and tenant,
immigration and family law. It does not discuss the other types of clinics which exist
such as those where students work on international human rights projects or in more
commercial fields designing business plans, corporate structures and even taxation
strategies for businesses and non-profit organizations. Many of the article's
arguments, however, are enhanced by the existence of these more diverse clinics.
83. See supra Part II.B.
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experiences in practice, as well as those of colleagues and friends in
the public interest realm.
Almost as important as the faculty are the clinical students. It takes
an immense amount of courage to resist not just the wining and dining
of corporate firms but the onset of anxiety when the whole law school
appears to have sewn up permanent job offers." As the law school
becomes awash in pinstripe during interview season and dining halls
boom with discussions of six-figure salaries, enormous bonuses and
luxurious accommodations and perks, the clinic provides a community
for the brave hearted. Of course many clinic students interview and
take jobs with corporate firms, but the atmosphere and work
performed penetrate the air of inevitability that pervades the rest of
the law school.
B. Exposure to Community and Client Needs
As mentioned above, many law students come to law school
without a profound sense of the depth of poverty or need for legal
services within many communities.85 Student desire to practice public
interest law is influenced greatly by the sense that their services are
not just valued but in fact can be integral to the survival of a
community. No inundation of information about income gaps,
increasing homelessness or the plight of the poor is a substitute for
actually meeting and befriending a seriously deprived person. As
Arthur Koestler puts it, "[s]tatistics don't bleed,"86 and pro bono work
can help "sensitize professionals to worlds they usually ignore."87
Exposure to extremes of deprivation and hardship might be expected
to deter or repel students, but most seem to become infused with
passion and zeal to make a difference.-' Such passion is fueled by the
84. See supra note 49.
85. See supra Part II.A.
86. Rhode, supra note 38, at 2431 (quoting Arthur Koestler).
87. Id. at 2435 (quoting former Tulane Law School Dean John Kramer); see also
Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old
Wounds?, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099, 2105 (1989).
88. Silver and Cross warn of the risks of exposing students to the life and values of
those on the wrong side of the tracks:
Some pro bono representations involve accused murderers, thieves, rapists,
wife-beaters, child molesters, drug dealers, and gang-bangers-bad people
who do bad things. After getting to know these individuals, some lawyers
may favor the death penalty more strongly than before.
... Many poor people have problems because they make bad choices.
Unemployment sometimes occurs because employees have engaged in
illegal or irresponsible behavior at work. Alcoholism and drug addiction
sometimes persist because abusers have refused treatment or surrounded
themselves with temptations. Diseases sometimes occur because people are
ignorant, superstitious, obese, inert, promiscuous, unclean, or unreliable
with medications. Excessive debt sometimes reflects immoderate spending.
Will lawyers who are required to represent clients who make poor choices
move to the left politically? Or will the experience of representing people
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discovery of just how easy it is to make a difference. Almost all
clinical students will have success stories - welfare benefits granted,
housing obtained, an eviction prevented, a disability recognized - and
all because of their efforts. Junior corporate associates will wait much
longer to gain the satisfaction of a clear victory through their work
alone.
Exposure to clinical work also tends to undermine pervasive myths,
harbored within the legal profession, about the value of poverty
lawyering. Take the arguments expressed by Charles Silver and Frank
B. Cross in their recent essay, What's Not to Like About Being a
Lawyer,89 in the Yale Law Journal. In reviewing Lawyer: A Life of
Counseling and Controversy, the memoirs of notable Yale alumnus
Arthur Liman, and commenting on Liman's commitment to pro bono
public interest work, Silver and Cross state: "What puzzles us is his
belief, which others share, that public service is a higher calling than
other legal work." 9 Silver and Cross argue, "lawyers who help paying
clients with private matters make valuable microeconomic
contributions by helping create and maintain the world of commerce
and valuable micropolitical contributions by maintaining a culture in
which people actively create and use legal rights."' The authors claim
that the way for law graduates to help end poverty is to work to
promote prosperity: "The tendency of economic growth and cash
transfers to reduce poverty is supported by considerable empirical
evidence. The tendency of legal services to do so is not."'
The influence of the type of arguments made by Silver and Cross
cannot be underestimated. They are parroted by almost anyone who
has joined a large corporate firm. They are intuitively appealing and
comforting to corporate lawyers and phrased in the type of language
they become accustomed to using. Of course the argument is a
version of "the trickledown effect" approach promoted by the
whose values are unlike theirs and who fail to help themselves harden them
against the poor? We will not pretend to know.
Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1492 (emphasis added). Silver and Cross are right -
we don't know how many students will be turned off. But we also don't know how
many students will be turned on to public interest lawyering as a result of their clinic
experiences. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
In general, most clinic students I have met emerge with a more nuanced
understanding of the causes of crime and poverty and are less prone to simplistic
ideas such as "criminals are bad people who do bad things" or "poor people make bad
choices and fail to help themselves." Many may begin to see crime and poverty as the
outgrowth of a totality of circumstances: they may find a child molester or abuser who
himself endured horrendous abuse; they may find that addiction has a genetic link or
a strong basis in neglect, abuse and trauma; they also may find that the values of
"those people" are in fact remarkably similar to their own. See also infra note 107 and
accompanying text.
89. Silver & Cross, supra note 60.
90. Id. at 1494.
91. Id. at 1449.
92. Id at 1482.
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Reaganomics school of thought in the 1980s. Most clinic students
quickly become skeptical of such arguments after they discover the
levels of poverty that still exist within the ostensibly prosperous
United States community, especially the large, indeed increasing,
demand experienced by homeless shelters, soup kitchens and
charitable organizations. 93 Silver and Cross do not dispute that
poverty still exists, nor do they suggest that lawyers do nothing but
work in large firms. What they argue is that pro bono legal services
are inefficient:
We see no reason to encourage lawyers to make donations of legal
services their preferred form of charity. Many poor people need
money, hot meals, home repairs, medical assistance, transportation,
and help with chores far more than they need legal services.
Lawyers should provide the forms of charity that poor people need
most, especially gifts of cash. 94
Silver and Cross acknowledge that most promoters of pro bono
work do not object to infusions of cash, but they question whether
such donations are likely to be made. Silver and Cross point to the
remarkable philanthropy of George Soros and Bill Gates (neither of
whom, ironically, are lawyers or law graduates).95 Their extraordinary
generosity and valuable contributions to public work were made
possible by achieving enormous wealth, and Silver and Cross ask, to
paraphrase, would it be better if they had sacrificed their hours
93. See, e.g., Elizabeth Becker, Millions Eligible for Food Stamps Aren't Applying,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 2001, at Al; Nina Bernstein, Homeless Shelters in New York Fill
to Highest Level Since 80's, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8,2001, at Al.
94. Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1478.
95. In fact, Gates and Soros are good examples of the power of actual exposure.
Bill Gates has undergone a transformation in his philanthropy. Initially his grants and
donations concentrated on providing access to computing technology to the
underprivileged-a tactic dismissed by many as a cynical public relations exercise that
insidiously promoted the monopoly of Microsoft operating systems. Gates tells the
story of how, one day in an impoverished shanty town in Soweto, South Africa, he
realized that the town had only one power outlet and thought to himself, "Hey, wait a
minute... computers may not be the highest priority in this particular place." Jean
Strouse, How to Give Away $21.8 Billion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2000, (Magazine) at
56. Gates subsequently donated considerably more attention to global health issues
and has donated over $750 million to health initiatives run by WHO, UNICEF and
other charitable foundations. Id. Gates's recent grant of $40 million to homeless
shelters could equally have been the result of a transformative experience while
standing inside a shelter. George Soros is clearly convinced of the value of legal
services-a large proportion of public law initiatives in America are at least partly
funded by the Soros Foundation. See, e.g., Lawyers for the Poor Earn Little Money,
Lots of Satisfaction; Philanthropist's Grants Pay Salaries, School Loans, St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Oct. 18, 1998, at D10; Philanthropist Challenges Others to Invest in
Justice, Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Sept. 1998, at 33; Henry Weinstein,
Billionaire's Matching Grant Program to Benefit Legal Aid Services, L.A. Times, June
3, 1998, at A28 (describing Soros's generosity in funding organizations and programs
that provide legal services for the poor).
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creating wealth to instead lend an unskilled hand in a soup kitchen? "
I can think of two answers prompted by my clinical experience. First:
yes, if only by working in a soup kitchen did they become aware of
how many people outside the restaurants of the business district of
Manhattan were actually starving. Experience provides impetus for
change. Many wealthy men and women are aware of the horrendous
effects of disabilities but only become passionate advocates for the
rights of the disabled after they (or their friend or sister) give birth to
a disabled child. Similarly, many students only become aware of just
how clumsy the invisible hand of the marketplace can be when they
see a client to whom they have become attached suddenly become
homeless, be denied benefits, be denied access to education or their
children, or even be put behind bars.
My second answer draws from the Chinese proverb: "Give a man a
fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him
for a lifetime." 97 Poverty lawyering at best teaches the client how to
fish, at worst sews the client a valuable net. When Silver and Cross
state, "[r]are indeed is the indigent person who would rather have
twenty hours of a lawyer's time than $5,000,"'  they are being
extraordinarily short sighted. Clinical lawyers work to secure
permanent affordable housing, to obtain recognition of disabilities so
that clients can obtain life-long pensions, and to keep clients in their
own houses and out of homeless shelters and prisons. In real financial
terms most of these services are worth far more than $5,000 in cash.
Twenty hours with a poverty lawyer could net a disabled client over a
quarter of a million dollars over a lifetime." More significantly,
clinical lawyers and students work to help people help themselves.
They teach people how to apply for benefits, challenge administrative
decisions, exercise their own legal rights and assist others in their
community in exercising theirs. Clinical lawyers also work for long-
term change. They work to implement legislative reforms and they
initiate impact litigation in order to challenge welfare laws or change
96. Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1483-84.
97. Harold V. Cordry, The Multicultural Dictionary of Proverbs 258 (1997).
98. Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1484.
99. This figure is based on an eligible client obtaining a federal Social Security
Insurance ("SSI") pension. In the year 2000 a base monthly payment of SSI was S500.
Over thirty years (without accounting for inflation) this would amount to S180,000.
Over sixty years (children are eligible for SSI) the figure would be $360,000. SSI
recipients are also eligible for food stamps, Medicaid and state subsidized income and
subsidized housing. In Connecticut, in the year 2001 an SSI recipient would receive
approximately $800 per month in combined federal and state income and food
stamps. Over thirty years (without accounting for inflation) this would amount to
$288,000. The value of medical services and subsidized housing would of course
greatly increase the value. Interview with Mary-Christy Fisher, staff attorney, New
Haven Legal Assistance (June 5, 2001): see also Linda Landry, An Advocate's Guide
to Surviving the SSI System: Financial and Other Nondisability Criteria 1 (2000). Of
course Silver and Cross may object to the provision of these government services, but
an evaluation of such objections is beyond the scope of this article.
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the structure and management of prisons, schools and other public
institutions to better suit the needs of the disadvantaged.
Preliminary evidence suggests that clinical legal education works to
achieve the goal of getting students more involved in public interest
work. Deborah Rhode of Stanford Law School made encouragement
of clinical legal education, including endorsing mandatory
involvement in clinics, the cornerstone of her term as President of the
American Association of Law Schools ("AALS"). She found:
At Tulane, the first school to impose pro bono requirements, two-
thirds of graduates reported that participation in public service had
increased their willingness to participate in the future, and about
three-quarters agreed that they had gained confidence in their
ability to represent indigent clients. At other schools, between
three-fourths and four-fifths of students who participated in
mandatory pro bono programs also indicated that their experience
had increased the likelihood that they would engage in similar work
as practicing attorneys....
From the limited evidence available, the safest generalization
seems to be that positive experience with pro bono work as a
student will at least increase the likelihood of similar work later in
life. 1°°
Of course it is naive to expect that more clinical work in law school
will prompt a student stampede from corporate interviews to legal
services clinics. And it is true, some will be put off or at least harden
in their reluctance to work in impoverished environments'0' because
clinic work is difficult, demanding, emotionally draining and often
frustrating (although there is a perverse "marine attitude" among
some elite students that makes these challenges quite attractive). But
exposure to clinic work adds a realistic dimension to the philosophy of
100. Rhode, supra note 38, at 2434-35.
101. Arguably it is a mistake to think that a clinic has "failed" if it puts students off
a career in public interest work. See Abbe Smith, Carrying on in Criminal Court:
When Criminal Defense is not so Sexy and Other Grievances, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 723,
724 (1995). Smith responds to an article by a student who was deterred from a career
in criminal defense after a semester of clinical experience:
[L]ike many students who explore criminal defense practice in a law school
clinic, Rader struggled hard with what it means to be a criminal lawyer and
whether the fit was a good one for him. He learned a lot about how the
American criminal justice system works-or doesn't-in the setting in which
most people experience the criminal law. He experienced and grappled with
a wide range of ethical and tactical dilemmas. Notwithstanding enormous
institutional constraints, he represented his clients well. What clinical
teacher could ask for more?
Id. at 724-25 (responding to Robert Rader, Confessions of Guilt: A Clinic Student's
Reflections on Representing Indigent Criminal Defendants, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 299, 302
(1994)).
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a "noble profession." For those leaning towards public interest work,
clinical experience illustrates the excitement, responsibility and
rewards that are inherent in community service work. For the
majority of students, who will go into law firms no matter what,
clinical experience cannot reduce the competitive billing pressures in
firms. It does, however, provide insight into poverty, knowledge of
the difference that lawyers can make, and some powerful and
memorable images to be conjured up when the next "pro bono
opportunity" e-mail arrives. Clinics are not a complete solution but
are infinitely preferable to the alternative. Ignorant of the work that
clinical lawyers perform, convinced that their work enhances the
prosperity of all, and increasingly forgetful of the need that exists
outside oak-paneled conference rooms, the likelihood is that
associates will eschew both pro bono opportunities and cash donations
as they succumb to the constant pressure to bill more and work
harder, forgetting about the world outside corporate practice.
C. Ethics
Few would deny that the teaching of legal ethics and professional
responsibility by traditional coursework has been an abject failure at
most law schools. "[T]he legal ethics course is-not to put too fine a
point on it-the dog of the curriculum, despised by students, taught by
overworked deans or underpaid adjuncts, and generally disregarded
by the faculty at large."1 02 There is an emerging consensus that to be
taught well ethics must be taught practically, not academically."'3
Current literature suggests that ethics are "more likely to be caught
than taught,""° that students and practitioners learn ethics not
through being taught ethical content but through being presented with
ethical dilemmas, observing how to resolve them in an ethical manner,
and integrating the lessons learned into their practice.
In an article directed at ethical teaching in elite schools,l"e Patrick
Schiltz (graduate of an elite law school, former Supreme Court clerk,
and partner in a national law firm before making the transition to
teaching) identifies three challenges to teaching ethics in a way that
makes a lasting impact upon future lawyers. The first challenge for an
ethics teacher is to expose the frequency with which ethical dilemmas
arise. Schooled in the dramatically exaggerated ethical conflicts
depicted in popular culture, students struggle to believe that they will
102. David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark
Times, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 31, 37-38 (1995).
103. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers and Virtues: A Review Essay of Mary Ann
Glendon's A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession is
Transforming American Society and Anthony T. Kroninan's The Lost Las-Yer: Failing
Ideals of the Legal Profession, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 707, 726-728 (1996).
104. Id. at 727 (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. See Schiltz, supra note 35.
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ever behave as unethically as the lawyers they see on television, or
that they will regularly find themselves in ethical quandaries. Their
academic attention to legal ethics inevitably declines." 6
Second, and complicating matters further, the content of ethics
cannot be taught precisely in the classroom. The genuine content of
ethics is not so much defined by precise legal codifications like the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct or by case law, but rather
consists of "the entire ensemble of understandings that lawyers
observe in their dealings with one another, with clients, and with the
courts.' 1 7 Lawyers develop an understanding of the ethical norms of
the profession through exposure to them in practice and by
maintaining and fostering connections with lawyers throughout the
legal community.
Finally, unlike the unusual and borderline cases that students often
study in class, Schiltz argues that most ethical dilemmas students face
in practice are common ones. 08 They are ethically difficult, not
because lawyers struggle with identification of the relevant issue or
rule but due to the circumstances in which a lawyer will be placed.
Schiltz gives the example of padding a time sheet. 9 A recent elite
law school graduate at a large firm will be under tremendous
pressure-both from the firm and her own competitive instincts-to
bill as much time as is humanly possible in order to keep pace with her
colleagues. She will be exhausted, having worked the consistently
long hours expected of a junior associate. Most likely she will feel
isolated in the atmosphere of increasing competition between
associates at law firms, and she may lack guidance as more and more
senior attorneys abandon mentoring relationships with junior staff to
devote their full attention to working and billing in a thriving but
intensely competitive legal market. For a graduate to know how to
respond ethically in such situations she must have learned how to
integrate ethical conduct from an early stage in her legal development,
so that instead of struggling to make an ethical decision under
pressure, the lawyer almost reflexively behaves ethically.' 0
Schiltz's approach to teaching ethics can be compared to the
challenges of teaching a novice driver. Driving skills are best taught
early so that tasks like regularly checking rear mirrors or smoothly
changing gears are integrated into the overall learning experience
until they are performed by rote and without thought. This is the best
way to ensure that they are performed in times of high stress and
under time pressure. To take the analogy one step further, intense
instruction on road rules is not going to prepare a driver adequately
106. Id. at 709-10, 718-20.
107. Id. at 718-20 (quoting Glendon, supra note 9, at 78).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Seeid. at 736.
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for getting out on the road, where he will find that rules are constantly
subverted by the other drivers and it is in fact impossible to both drive
safely and obey all traffic rules. t" To learn which rules must be
adhered to in order to ensure safety and legality and which can safely
be bent to ensure both safety and convenience, requires careful
teaching and observation with an experienced driver.
Clinical teachers are better suited than the elite law school
mainstream faculty to meet the three challenges set out by Schiltz."2
A clinical law student quickly becomes aware of the breadth and
complexity of ethical questions that lawyers face each and every time
they undertake a case. Clinical supervision provides the time and the
opportunity for practical ethical mentoring. It allows students to
discuss ethical conflicts with experienced and skilled practitioners who
usually have formed and maintained a variety of connections and
networks with the legal community which assist them in navigating the
ethical norms of the profession. Clinical class time is devoted to more
academic explorations of ethical issues, as well as global issues of
justice and equality that drive the work of public interest attorneys.
While clinical experience is ideally suited to those who plan to
embark on careers in public interest law, Schiltz's approach reveals
why clinical training can be of particular value in teaching ethics to
students who will practice entirely in the world of commerce. The
appellate case law of the mainstream law curriculum does little to
alert students to ethical dilemmas faced by lawyers. A course in
professional responsibility, where students will encounter only bold
and dramatic ethical conflicts, adds little more. Without experience in
spotting, let alone resolving, common ethical dilemmas, most students
111. Schiltz uses a similar analogy: "Just as there are 'posted' and 'real' speed limits
in each community-and just as 'real' speed limits vary among communities that
observe the same 'posted' limits-so too are there 'posted' and 'real' rules when it
comes to sanctioning unethical conduct." Id. at 718.
112. Schiltz writes:
If the academy is to provide effective mentoring. at least three conditions
are necessary (although not sufficient):
First, the academy must accept that one of its functions is to prepare
students to practice law-and to practice law ethically....
Second, every faculty must include a number of people who have
substantial experience practicing law or a genuine interest in the work of
practitioners and judges....
Finally, professors must be willing to spend time with students.
Id. at 747. These characteristics stand in direct contrast to the composition of the
faculty of elite law schools. The lack of time and practical experience is self-evident
and has been discussed above. The attitude of most elite law professors toward the
goals of law schools is aptly summarized by Owen Fiss: "Law professors are not paid
to train lawyers, but to study the law and to teach their students what they happen to
discover." See "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J.
Legal Educ. 1, 26 (1985) (letter from Owen Fiss to Paul D. Carrington among
exchange of letters in response to Paul D. Carrington's article Of Law and the River,
34 J. Legal Educ. 222 (1984)).
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will only have law firm culture to guide them when they leave law
school. In contrast, not only will clinic veterans be more sensitized to
the frequency with which ethical dilemmas arise and the need to
contextualize their dilemmas within the practicing norms of the
profession, but they will have integrated a notion of a moral compass
into their own legal development.
Ideal ethical training leaves a student asking the questions "am I
doing what is right, what is ethical, what is professionally appropriate"
as frequently as they would check their side-view mirrors. After all, as
Schiltz submits, behaving ethically is not always complicated:
For the most part, the principle that practitioners use to distinguish
the ethical from the unethical is the same one that most people use
to distinguish good deeds from bad deeds: The Golden Rule. Do
unto others as you would have them do unto you. Be honest. Be
fair. Be courteous. Be compassionate. Be true to your word. As
Abraham Lincoln recognized, "virtue in a lawyer [is] not much
different from common decency in any other calling.
Clinical training encourages just such an approach. While traditional
teaching methods can leave students believing "[t]here is always an
argument the other way and the devil often has a very good case, ' 14
clinical teachers encourage students to get in touch with and trust
their moral intuitions. For example Bob Solomon and Steve Wizner
of Yale proudly promote the maxim "if it offends your sense of justice
there is a cause of action." 15
D. Humanity
Kronman states, "[I]ndeed many hope that the intrinsic satisfaction
that [a career in law] affords will be important enough to play a
significant role in their fulfillment as human beings."'1 6 An integral
part of Kronman's thesis is that students should develop a moral
compass or rudder that will help them navigate the ruthless
materialism of an often unethical profession. "7 This development
requires a law school experience where students grow and develop as
human beings and are able to trust their own moral instincts. Most
accounts of elite law schools however, including those devoured by
law school bound college graduates, such as One L," s The Paper
Chase"9 and Planet Law School, 20 savage the impact that elite law
113. Schiltz, supra note 35, at 709 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
114. Rhode, supra note 38, at 2446 (quoting Stewart Macaulay, Law Schools and
the World Outside the Doors II 25 (1982)).
115. Stephen Wizner, Speech delivered to Association of American Law Schools,
Section on Clinical Legal Education (Jan. 6, 1994).
116. Kronman, supra note 1, at 2.
117. See id. at 145-46; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
118. Turow, supra note 46.
119. John Jay Osborn, The Paper Chase (1971); The Paper Chase (20th Century
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schools have on students' development as human beings. The
professors are portrayed as cruel and sadistic egomaniacs, relishing
their expertise while terrified students flounder hopelessly in
confusion. No account seems to suggest that law school is an
experience worthwhile for its own sake, an enjoyable intellectual
exercise. The elite law school is viewed instead as an ordeal to be
endured like boot camp, but it is worse than boot camp because there
is hardly any suggestion that law school prepares students for the
profession which they are about to enter. While students are
encouraged to take comfort that they are developing some basic skills
(analytical reasoning, problem solving, oral expression and the
amorphous "thinking like a lawyer"), practical training in specific
lawyering skills is largely non-existent.
The following quotes provide a good illustration of how elite law
schools have been perceived as destroying the humanity of students:
The hardest job of the first year is to lop off your common sense, to
knock your ethics into temporary anesthesia. Your view of social
policy, your sense of justice-to knock these out of you along with
woozy thinking .... [I]t is an almost impossible process to achieve
the technique [of thinking like a lawyer] without sacrificing some
humanity first.'1
Intimidation is the law school dragon.... [and the Socratic method
is] designed to make you look stupid, cause traumatic embarrassment,
and make you feel like you ivere never cut out to be a lawyer i ti e
first place.1 2
[T]he Socratic method ... can also be thought of as The Professor
Always Wins, and the Student Lives in Terror. Make no mistake,
terror is an integral part of the law school experience .... 21
[Before reaching their second year, students] ... have been treated
as incompetents, terrorized daily, excluded from privilege, had their
valued beliefs ridiculed, and in general felt their sense of self-worth
thoroughly demeaned.124
Law [school] had made me less human, asked that I dismiss my
moral center as a dangerous, incomprehensible Pandora's box.'.
The main goal of law school, especially what occurs in first-year, is to
destroy students' belief in morality, and to replace it with cynicism
Fox 1973).
120. Falcon, supra note 46.
121. Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Studies 116 (1960).
122. George J. Roth, Slaying the Law School Dragon: A Primer on How to Survive
and Combat Law School Intimidation (1981), quoted in Falcon. supra note 46, at 285.
123. Mark H. McCormack, The Terrible Truth About Lawyers (1987), quoted in
Falcon, supra note 46, at 285.
124. Turow, supra note 46, quoted in Falcon, supra note 46, at 286.
125. Goodrich, supra note 45, at 115.
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and amorality. At that, it succeeds very well. The "terrorism" and
intimidation are a crucial part of this process.126
[My class room experience] was probably characterized by a lot of
fear.... I felt pretty lost. I ... personally found classes
intimidating. 12
7
Law students tend to identify the Socratic teaching method
(sometimes referred to as "S&M") as the principle culprit for their
traumatic experiences. 128 Kronman and Edwards primarily blame law
school content, especially the critical legal studies movement's
endorsement of moral relativism tending towards nihilism. 29 But it
can be argued that the problem stems not from what is being said to
the students, nor even the method by which it is said, but rather the
attitude of the people who are doing the talking. It is important to
note that the comments above were made about law school
experiences which occurred 3 ' in 1933, 1942, 1957, 1979, 1987, 1989
and 1996, respectively, encompassing changes in legal scholarship and
teaching methods and predating the movements that Kronman and
Edwards identify as the source of the problem. The words most
commonly used in the quotes are "intimidation" and "terror." Is it
possible that students' senses of justice, humanity and common good
are harmed less by the lack of certainty of legal principle, or lack of
reverence for the traditions of law, than by teachers who deliberately
and systematically undertake to ruin students' sense of self-worth and
the value of their own ideas?
For example, at Yale Law School students revere professors, like
Steven Bright, who use rigorous and demanding questioning
methods.' They reward professors, like William Eskridge, who
specialize in esoteric "law and.. ." fields of scholarship, 13 2 and they
126. Falcon, supra note 46, at 290.
127. Gaber, supra note 39, at 181 (alteration in original).
128. See, e.g., Falcon, supra note 46, at 285 ("The inordinate competition is
engendered by a system of daily recitation which is designed to make you look stupid,
cause traumatic embarrassment, and make you feel like you were never cut out to be a
lawyer in the first place."); Jennifer Howard, Learning To "Think Like A Lawyer"
Through Experience, 2 Clinical L. Rev. 167, 172 (1995) ("The traditional Socratic
method emphasizes client-less analysis in a situation of competition and isolation, and
in the process seriously undermines students' confidence and self-esteem.").
129. See Edwards, supra note 2, at 69.
130. The first six dates are those of the respective author's attendance at law
school, not publication dates.
131. Professor Bright is consistently nominated for student-voted teaching awards
and was selected by students to deliver the 1999 Yale Law School Graduating
Address.
132. Professor Eskridge was awarded the 2000 Yale Law Women Teaching Award
and selected by students to deliver the 2001 Graduating Address. Professor Eskridge
teaches mainstream classes like Civil Procedure and Constitutional Law, but his
teaching award for the year 2000 was primarily based on his successful teaching of the
course: "Sexuality, Gender and the Law".
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value those, like Owen Fiss, who are critical of legal traditions and
premises. 33 Anecdotal evidence suggests that what students value
most fundamentally about these teachers is that they care about their
students as human beings. This sentiment is not derived as much from
the content of the professors' courses, or their views of the value of
law as a tradition, as the way that they actually speak and interact with
students. One Yale student said of Professor Bright: "He's just like-
Steve. He's got this wonderful personality. He's genuinely interested
in everything you have to say. He would drop everything, even
though he's swamped and busy... his door was always open."'' - An
Asian student told me that she liked the class of Owen Fiss, probably
Kronman's intellectual nemesis in the arguments he advances,
because he was one of the few professors who ever bothered learning
to pronounce her name correctly.
Learning names will not cure every ill. The intimidation and
personal alienation experienced by new law students is a complex
subject. Some of the anxiety experienced by elite law students is
inevitable given the composition of the student body. It has been
suggested by psychologists that law students share certain common
traits. Research validates the lawyer stereotype: intelligent,
dominant, aggressive, ambitious, competitive people who are not
particularly warm and fuzzy types and who crave attention and have
the ability to lead others.135 Placing such people together in a
competitive environment inexorably leads to some unpleasant
consequences. After amassing a high degree of achievement in order
to be accepted to an elite law school, students develop expectations of
themselves and their own success which cannot possibly be met by law
school. Many elite students will fail (at least in their own minds, by
being average) for the first time in their lives at law school. Those
who are grappling with a sense of failure will meet others who have a
"tendency to respond to stress by becoming more aggressive and
ambitious."'36
Placed in this type of environment, students sometimes feel the
need to act out the worst stereotypes of lawyerly aggression and
133. Both Edwards and Kronman identify Professor Fiss as a spokesperson for the
kind of teaching and scholarship towards which they direct their concern. Professor
Fiss remains, judging by comments to me and enormous enrollments, one of the most
popular teachers at Yale Law School.
134. Gaber, supra note 39, at 213.
135. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Dressed For Ercess: How Hollywood Affects The
Professional Behavior Of Lawyers, 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 49, 70
(2000); see also Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself. A Review Of Empirical
Research On Attorney Attributes Bearing On Professionalism, 46 Am. U. L Rev. 1337
(1997).
136. Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Shouhl Lawyers
Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to
Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 547, 594
(1998).
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amorality. This may be influenced by images of lawyers and law
professors as portrayed in popular culture. Students, who see many
negative movie and television portrayals of lawyers, can unconsciously
adopt the worst traits of the profession.'37 Intimidated by the success
of their peers and afraid of failure, students cling to stereotypes,
thinking if they act "more like a lawyer" they are more likely to
succeed. Even professors can fall into this trap. Surrounded by super-
successful peers and aggressively intelligent and ambitious students,
some professors seem to deliberately imitate the teaching styles
depicted in movies like The Paper Chase and books like One L.
Falcon calls this the "Kingsfield" or "Perini" syndrome-named after
the professors portrayed in The Paper Chase and One L,
respectively.'38 While the authors created their mythical professors as
amalgams of the worst excesses of law school teaching, many
professors see some cache in being like them, mistaking bullying with
being brilliant and demanding.
So why does it matter if students are a little miserable at law
school? Making any institution more humane is obviously a goal in
itself, but the issue has greater significance for the purpose of this
article. First, students are more vulnerable to being wooed by
corporate firms if their self-esteem and self-worth has been shaken by
law school. 139  It has been oft repeated that both full-time public
interest work and pro bono work in law firms require a certain
amount of courage to swim against the stream of the dominant law
school and corporate firm culture. 140 Of course temptation will always
137. See generally Michael Asimow, Bad Lawyers in The Movies, 24 Nova L. Rev.
533 (2000); Rapoport, supra note 135.
138. Falcon, supra note 46, at 122-24; see also James D. Gordon III, How Not to
Succeed in Law School, 100 Yale L.J. 1679, 1688 (1991). Gordon relates the following
story:
A law professor's greatest aspiration is to be like Professor Kingsfield in the
movie The Paper Chase. One professor who saw the movie decided (this is a
true story) to act out one of the scenes from the film in his class. He called
on a student, who replied that he was unprepared. The professor said, "Mr.
Jones, come down here." The student walked all the way down to the front
of the class. The professor gave the student a dime, and said, "Take this
dime. Call your mother. Tell her that there is very little chance of your ever
becoming a lawyer." Ashamed, the student turned and walked slowly
toward the door. Suddenly, however, he had a flash of inspiration. He
turned around, and in a loud voice, said, "NO, Clyde." (He called the
professor by his first name.) "I have a BETTER idea! YOU take this dime,
and you go call ALL YOUR FRIENDS!!!" The class broke into
pandemonium. The professor broke the student into little bitty pieces.
Id. at 1688.
139. Kennedy has commented: "Law school... teaches students that they are
weak, lazy, incompetent and insecure. And it also teaches them that... large
institutions will take care of them almost no matter what." Duncan Kennedy, Legal
Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983),
quoted in Kahlenberg, supra note 34, at 163.
140. See supra Part II.C.
[Vol. 70
FOUND! THE LOST LAWYER
be present, but the palliative tonic of money, prestige and flattery may
hold less sway to those who can maintain a robust self-image. The
connection may seem somewhat tenuous but it has been a consistently
iterated theme in elite law school memoirs like One L and Broken
Contract,141 and there is at least some anecdotal evidence that students
who attend more humane institutions are more likely to be attracted
to public interest work than those who attend schools renowned for
their aggressive and competitive atmospheres. 42
Secondly, as Kronman and Schiltz argue, a sense of humanity and
moral imagination, along with a moral compass or anchor, are
important tools in the goal to behave ethically. 4 3 This makes sense:
the more connected a law graduate is with his innate moral sense, the
more likely he is to uphold the moral norms of the noble profession.
Furthermore, lawyers often fall down in their duties to their clients or
the public good not because of ignorance of appropriate professional
conduct but because disillusionment and burnout leave them too
emotionally exhausted to comply with the often heroic demands of
noble and ethical conduct."4 The experience or fear of emotional
burnout is also often the reason why lawyers leave or avoid public
interest work or pro bono obligations.'45
The vulnerability of legal professionals to the more dramatic
manifestations of anxiety and depression seems to begin at law school.
Numerous studies of law students show that they suffer from high
levels of tension, anxiety and depression, sometimes even higher than
their counterparts in medical schools."4 A rigorous legal education
141. Kahlenberg, supra note 34, at 144; Turow, supra note 46, at 6.
142. For example many law students and professors (and not just those at Yale)
have told me that Yale students are more likely to participate in public interest work
than those at the famously competitive Harvard or Chicago law schools.
143. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 145-46; Schiltz, supra note 35, at 732. Schiltz
comments:
An attorney who is integrated internally uses the same moral compass in
all aspects of her life. She does not have one set of ethics for home and
another for the office....
A person with a strong enough moral compass may very well resist the
pressures of the legal profession on her own ....
Id.
144. See Ogletree, supra note 31, at 1289-90.
145. See Deborah L. Arron, Running from the Law: Why Good Lawyers are
Getting Out of the Legal Profession 2-3 (1989); Barry A. Farber, Crisis in Education:
Stress and Burnout in the American Teacher 24 (1991); Ogletree, supra note 31, at
1289-90; Rader, supra note 101, at 302.
146. See Daicoff, supra note 135, at 1407 (providing a comprehensive examination
of the literature that demonstrates that law students find law school psychologically
and emotionally difficult); Peter G. Glenn, Some Thoughts About Developing
Constructive Approaches to Lawyer and Law Student Distress, 10 J.L. & Health 69, 69
(1995-96) (explaining that law students report high levels of distress in law school);
Vemellia R. Randall, The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, First Year Law Students and
Performance, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 63, 66 (1995-96) (noting that many first-year law
students become overwhelmed by "failure anxiety"); Suzanne C. Segerstrom,
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experience may once have been thought to toughen students up, but
the better view promotes self-esteem over brutalization and suggests
that the fewer emotional scars inflicted upon a student before
embarking on her career in the stressful real world the better. 47
At this point it is instructive to note two things. First, the students
who are hit hardest by the intimidation of law school, and those who
are most vocal in making demands for a kinder, gentler law school,
are those who represent its new face-women and ethnic minorities.
Minority students and women (who despite their almost equal
numbers report feeling like a minority) are tired of feeling intimidated
and worthless. In 1998 the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
published "Just Trying to Be Human in this Place," 14 an article which
evaluated the experiences at Yale Law School of twenty women,
including women of color. The piece had a tremendous impact on a
law school that prides itself on being the most "humane" and "gentle"
of the elite law schools, 149 and an "emergency town meeting" of
students and faculty was called to address the revelations. The article
was consistent with the concerns articulated in numerous studies of
female and minority students at elite law schools. 50 The women
reported that in their first year of legal education "their voices were
'stolen' from them" '51 in a cold, sexist and dehumanizing
environment.152
In contrast to the mainstream law school, many students, especially
women and minorities, reported finding their safe haven from terror
and intimidation in the clinical environment: As one student put it,
"I'm really grateful for the [Yale Legal Services] clinic, and having
that be just sort of a place to go. And that was also a community of
people, that were there."'' 53
Most law school students would agree that 'the clinic rats'-the
students who form the core of the clinical sub-culture of a law
school-are among the friendliest and the happiest students. The
Perceptions of Stress and Control in the First Semester of Law School, 32 Willamette
L. Rev. 593, 595 (1996) ("[Llaw students consistently reported significantly higher
levels of stress than did medical students .... ).
147. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
148. Gaber, supra note 39.
149. See, e.g., Kahlenberg, supra note 34, at 19 ("If we'd wanted soft, we would
have gone to Yale, where people are said to like law school.").
150. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Lessons and Challenges of Becoming Gentlemen, 24
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 1 (1998); Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted
but Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5 Berkeley Women's
L.J. 1 (1989-90); Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on
Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1547 (1993); Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling,
The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1299 (1988).
151. Gaber, supra note 39, at 167 (citing Lani Guanier et al., Becoming Gentlemen:
Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1994)).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 182 (alteration in original).
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same is often said of clinical faculty. When asked to identify a mentor,
a favorite professor, or just a faculty member they felt comfortable
talking to at Yale, students consistently nominated clinical
professors.5' One student made the following statement: "My
interaction with the clinical faculty is wonderful. I don't know, they're
just very friendly, warm people."'55 Students identified other "nice
professors" and expressed hope that they could work towards
improving the law school environment, but it seems clear, at least at
Yale, that clinical professors have had by far the most success.
Of course this revelation was not controversial. The clinic has long
been regarded as a comforting environment to the self-selected "warm
and fuzzy types" outside the traditional mold of law students and law
professors. In Just Trying to be Hwnan in this Place, Gaber notes that
student comfort with the clinical faculty went beyond personalities;
the students also valued diversity.'56 The clinical staff at Yale is
divided equally along gender lines and includes the faculty's first and,
until recently, only tenured woman of color. Students at Yale value
their interactions with non-clinical faculty members of color,' and
have been persistently vocal in their demands for more professors of
color. The clinic, however, is the only place where their calls for
minorities appear to have been heard.
Secondly, there are certain inherent qualities that lead to a
perception of the clinic as a "community" rather than an intimidating
environment of ambitious individuals. In a clinic, the competitive
environment of law school evaporates. Students are not graded nor
are they called upon to perform and be judged by professors and
peers, as they are in a typical classroom setting.1' s The only way for a
student to succeed in a clinical setting is to represent a client to the
best of the student's ability. At best, clinical students discover that
collaboration is an important lawyering skill that enhances both the
working environment and the representation. 59  At worst, a
competitive student will become invisible, devoting herself only to an
impoverished client.
Ironically, the ambitious and competitive student may benefit most
from clinical legal education. Legal education literature has identified
"empathy" as a critical legal "skill" that clinics try to develop in their
154. Seeid. at211.
155. Id. at 212.
156. See id.
157. Seeid. at211.
158. Many students report that elimination or reduced emphasis on grades does not
eliminate competition as they are most intimidated by the assessments of faculty and
other students when they speak in class.
159. David F. Chavkin, Matchmaker, Matchmaker Student Collaboration in
Clinical Programs, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 199, 204 (1994): Howard, supra note 128, at 192-
97.
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students. 16 The most effective way to develop empathy in a clinical
setting is to encourage a strong identification with the client.'16 Even
the most ambitious student, and the one least sympathetic to the
plight of the actual client, will at some level identify with the client's
cause because that is the most effective, in fact only, way to notch a
legal "win." Armed with this basic prerequisite, students in clinics
embark upon an educational journey towards a realization that is at
once simple and obvious and yet almost impossible to teach:
institutions respond differently to different people, even when they
have apparently identical legal claims.
What better way to teach this lesson than through actual
experience? An ambitious young law student can digest and critique
Charles Lawrence's seminal work, Unconscious Racism,62 with great
aplomb; but the student is considerably more likely to internalize
Lawrence's thesis when a brilliant and painstakingly prepared legal
argument for a client of color is arbitrarily dismissed by a hostile judge
who mutters something under his breath about "these people.' ' 63
This transformative lesson is most important for those elite students
who do not embark upon careers in public interest law. Many elite
law students, especially those who excel at prestigious law firms and
then move into government or public policy work, will eventually
occupy positions which influence the shape and practices of courts,
160. See Jill Chaifetz, The Value of Public Service: A Model for Instilling a Pro
Bono Ethic in Law School, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1695, 1707 (1993) (commenting that
students who do pro bono work, "perhaps for the first time, learn to identify with the
powerless, and find gratification serving these clients"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's Missing from the MacCrate Report
- Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 593, 620 (1994)
(noting that "lawyers must learn how to 'feel with' others" and that "'empathy
training' is an essential part of the client-lawyer relationship").
161. See Ogletree, supra note 31, at 1271; Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the
Couch, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 392,429-30 (1971).
162. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987).
163. This illustration is based on the author's own experience. See also Homer C.
La Rue, Developing an Identity of Responsible Lawyering Through Experiential
Learning, 43 Hastings L.J. 1147 (1992). La Rue comments:
[T]he student... remarked that the judge never really saw who his client
was. The judge only saw a poor person of color and assumed that she was
trying to get more than that to which she was entitled. He was genuinely
outraged at the judge's inability or unwillingness to see past her racial and
class biases. The student noticed how his own desire to 'win' pushed him to
identify with his client in way that permitted him to experience, if only for a
moment, the powerlessness of a person who lives her life in a state of
subordination.
Id. at 1154-55.
Compare this experience with Kronman's assertion that practical wisdom
requires that "a lawyer must be able to lose himself in that other person's situation, to
see it from within in a way that makes it possible for him not just to name but
appreciate the interests, values, and ambitions that inform it." Kronman, supra note 1,
at 299.
[Vol. 70
FOUND! THE LOST LAWYER
administrative agencies and other social institutions. Clinical
lawyering requires students to see institutions through their clients'
eyes, and to be institutional translators in order to articulate the needs
of their clients to agencies who hold the power to grant or deny
them.1" The ever-present operation of racial and class biases, and
insight into the terror experienced by disadvantaged clients who have
to confront the legal institutions through which lawyers move with
ease, have been identified as the most important institutional lessons
to be drawn from clinical lawyering.16- But the lessons also operate at
a more practical and mundane level. Students who may one day
design operating procedures realize that the most basic requirement,
form or procedural step may have a dramatic impact upon a client
with a complicated and challenging life. Just as the simple act of
picking up a client for an appointment can expose an elite student to
home environments and deprivations they have never seen or even
contemplated before, the very act of responding to an institutional
demand to schedule an appointment for a client who is juggling the
demands of a disability, children or just ensuring her own continued
existence can force the student to reevaluate his understanding of the
most basic of procedures.
Of course none of these insights are original-an entire body of
clinical literature has developed around this theme, complemented by
educational literature which promotes experiential training, legal
education scholarship which stresses the need for law students to be
more exposed to institutional processes, and feminist theory which
emphasizes the development of the "ethic of care.""
164. See, e.g., Philip M. Genty, Clients Don't Take Sabbaticals: The Indispensable
In-House Clinic and the Teading of Empathy. 7 Clinical L. Rev. 273, 274 (2000)
(describing how representing needy clients in two family court cases helped the
author "to realize that in both cases the clients were looking to me to help them be
understood and. more importantly, respected" by social service agencies and the legal
system).
165. See, e.g., Gerald P. L6pez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 Stan. L
Rev. 1 (1989); Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 Yale L.J. 1049
(1970).
166. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development (1982); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st-
Century Perspective, 34 J. Legal Educ. 612, 616-17 (1984); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers
and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings
L.J. 1175, 1180-86 (1992); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theor'-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of
Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1599, 1617-19, 1654-56 (1991);
Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance
Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1256-59 (1991); Peter
Margulies, Re-Framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 Clinical L Rev. 605,
606-07 (1999); Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes To Law School. The Clinical
Education Of The Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L Rev. 1,
6-10 (1993); Harvey M. Weinstein, The Integration of Intellect and Feeling in the Study
of Law, 32 J. Legal Educ. 87, 90-92 (1982).
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But that is the beauty of clinical legal education - it can be so many
things to different people. It combines the development of the skills
needed for prudence and practical judgment while enhancing the
innate empathy and compassion of law students that Kronman
identifies as necessary for a professional's moral anchor.1 67 It bridges
the disjunction between law and practice that so concerns Edwards. It
promises a kinder, gentler law school experience, with the outside
possibility of a few less heart attacks and suicides and a few more
born-again public interest lawyers. Who can deny it offers as much to
elite law students as a contracts class?
IV. A CRITIQUE OF KRONMAN AND EDWARDS
A. Clinical Legal Education Versus Practical Doctrinal Scholarship
Part I of this article described how the selectiveness and expense of
elite schools leads to a student body composed primarily of a certain
restricted demographic, namely the children of middle and upper-class
professionals. That part suggested that the common socio-economic
experience of elite law students is one removed from exposure to
extreme hardship and thus removed from an understanding of the
need for public interest lawyers. It also argues that current elite law
faculty members are inadequate role models for students. Even with
the best of intentions, elite law school professors lack both the
practical experience and time to inspire or advise students to work in
the public sector, and they lack the skills needed to integrate practical
ethical lessons into students' legal training. Without exposure to
public interest work or guidance from elite faculty, most law students
will succumb to the financial temptation and competitive allure of
large private firms. All the factors discussed derive from the nature of
elite law schools and are likely to continue as long as there is demand
for such schools. Each factor also exists entirely independently of
legal scholarship movements such as critical legal studies or law and
economics.
Part II presented a solution directed at creating law students who
embody the traits of the lawyer-statesman. Clinical legal education
contextualizes the legal experience of elite law students. It exposes
them to both the deprivation that exists in communities and the
enormous satisfaction to be gained from helping alleviate
disadvantage. Furthermore, it undermines myths about poverty
lawyering that are pervasive within the corporate legal community.
Clinical law teachers can act as role models to students. They work
openly towards the public good and can advise students how to tread
167. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 145-46; see also supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
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alternative, and perhaps more satisfying, career paths. Finally, clinical
teaching is best placed to cultivate practical wisdom and ethical
professional ideals by integrating an understanding of ethical
dilemmas and ethical professional norms into a student's development
as a professional and, just as significantly, as a human being. Clinical
legal education is therefore ideally suited to developing the three
qualities of the lawyer-statesman which Kronman and Edwards most
admire: commitment to pro bono activity, practical wisdom and
ethical professional practice.
In comparison, the solution proposed by Kronman and Edwards-
an increased focus on practical doctrinal scholarship-seems
inadequate and unrealistic. Both Kronman and Edwards continually
refer to their desire that law graduates perform more pro bono work.
Kronman states: "the level of public-spiritedness within the
profession is today dismally low and needs to be increased. Lawyers
should spend more time on law reform and the pro bono
representation of worthy causes and clients."''" Edwards argues:
"Law students need concrete ethical training. They need to know why
pro bono work is so important.' 69
It can be assumed that Kronman and Edwards would like a number
of law graduates to work in public interest law full time and others to
combine pro bono work with commercial endeavors in the manner of
Arthur Liman. What Kronman and Edwards do not show, however,
is exactly how making law teaching and scholarship more practical will
make students immune to the temptations posed by the financial
rewards of corporate practice. Nor do they demonstrate how
knowledge of legal doctrine will lead students to resist the enormous
pressure on associates to abandon pro bono work and bill
competitively with their peers. What both Kronman and Edwards
assume is that if students identify law as a higher calling, and then
become attached to an image of themselves as lawyer-statesmen, they
will just perform pro bono work in the fine traditions of the past:
Kronman talks of how the common law tradition helps to inspire in
new attorneys a devotion to "the well-being of the law" and "the
soundness of the legal order." The stronger the "anchorage of his
devotion to the law," the more likely a lawyer will be able "to
summon... courage when needed" to resist the forces in the
profession pushing him toward unethical conduct.
17 1
Is this likely? Kronman seems to suggest that tradition can be a
more powerful force than legal training or the professional practice of
colleagues. Is devotion to the law sufficient to withstand the pressures
placed on competitive people in stressful environments like law school
168. Kronman, supra note 1, at 365.
169. Edwards, supra note 2. at 38.
170. Schiltz, supra note 35, at 734 (citations omitted).
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and legal practice? As Edwards states: "The J.D. who has no interest
in pro bono work, and knows nothing of professional responsibility,
will succumb all the more readily to the pervasive materialism of the
law firms.' 171 Where are J.D.s going to obtain this interest and how
are they going to learn professional responsibility? Elite law students
generally do not come from backgrounds where knowledge of the
desperate need for public interest work can be expected, and the law
faculty is too concerned with scholarship to perform or encourage pro
bono work. Shifting the emphasis of scholarship from theoretical to
practical addresses neither of these problems.
Part of Edwards's solution seems to require a change in the
composition of elite law school faculty to draw more from
practitioners with experience in both commercial and public interest
work. Edwards is critical of law professors who are "ivory tower
dilettantes"'7 and "wholly lacking in legal experience or training.' ' 7
-
He refers without comment to a clerk's suggestion that more
practitioners be hired,7 but he never explicitly endorses such a move.
Nor does he explain how such a move could take place given the
dominance in elite schools of the full-time academic and the
requirement of constant high-level scholarship to obtain tenure. What
Edwards instead endorses is that full-time academics, especially those
who have already achieved tenure, refocus their scholarship toward
more useful, doctrinal goals.
75
It is questionable just how realistic such a proposal is. Kronman
and Edwards seem to expect elite law school faculty to inculcate
students with a reverence and devotion for the traditions and ideals of
the lawyer-statesman when large numbers of elite professors have in
fact spent their entire highly decorated professions pursuing precisely
the movements Kronman and Edwards so abhor-law and economics
and other critical legal movements. As Kronman states in his
acknowledgments: "Above all I have benefited from the skeptical
encouragement of two of my colleagues, Bruce Ackerman and Owen
Fiss. I doubt that I shall ever persuade these two good friends that I
am right.' ' 76 These leopards are kings of the intellectual jungle and
Kronman acknowledges they won't change their spots. Does he really
expect that a plea for the lawyer-statesman ideal will turn around all
the others?
At best Kronman and Edwards can hope that some law school
faculty will teach in a practical doctrinal manner and encourage
171. Edwards, supra note 2, at 73.
172. Id. at 36.
173. Id. at 36-37.
174. Id. at 66.
175. Id. at 77 ("I see no reason why a tenured professor cannot simply choose to
engage in 'practical' scholarship and pedagogy.").
176. Kronman, supra note 1, at viii.
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students to pursue careers which enhance the public good. What will
this achieve? It is likely that elite students will simply adopt the
approach of Silver and Cross. They will consider that they are serving
a higher calling by performing exclusively corporate work. Silver and
Cross conclude their article: "The message we have extracted is not
'Lawyers: We do pro bono work' or 'Lawyers: We do public service.'
These justifications cover activities that few lawyers perform. It is
'Lawyers: We solve problems and help people build the world they
want to live in."''1 Arguments like those of Silver and Cross assuage
the cognitive dissonance a public-interest minded lawyer in a firm
might experience and they do so in the language of advancing a
practical and doctrinal ideal. Such arguments are far more dangerous
to pro bono work than any offered by law and economics or critical
legal studies.
B. "But I've Been Here All Along..."
Given the limitations of practical doctrinal scholarship as a model
and given the potential of clinical legal education to triumph over the
obstacles to promoting the lawyer statesman ideal, why don't
Kronman and Edwards adopt clinical legal education as their battle
cry? Their failure to even acknowledge clinical practice is puzzling.
Both Kronman and Edwards call for an increased recognition
among law teachers that they are training future lawyers, not just
future legal academics. 17  For Kronman this means particular
attention to the case method. 79  "Kronman shows how lawyers
historically have had a special role in exercising judgment through
their capacity to advise and represent their clients-that is, in their
relationship to actual cases. '"l8° One would assume that Kronman
would then endorse clinics, where students work with actual cases.
This would surely help in the development of practical wisdom to be
utilized later in practice, not to mention making the stressed new law
graduate's life a lot easier. In Double Billing, a best-selling and
frighteningly accurate portrayal of New York big-firm life, Harvard
Law School graduate Cameron Stracher writes:
Learning the facts of a case is the most important part of practicing
law and, of course, not taught in traditional law school classes. No
professor dumps one hundred thousand pages of documents on a
student's desk and tells him to figure out what's going on. No one
177. Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1502.
178. Kronman, supra note 1, at 264-70. 265 ("Most law students do not expect to
work in universities. In teaching law, one must accept this fact and help to prepare
students for a life lived in the world of affairs and not, like the teacher's, at a
contemplative distance from it."); see Edwards, supra note 2, at 35-42.
179. Kronman, supra note 1, at 375.
180. Michael A. Fitts, The Complicated Ingredients of Wisdom and Leadership, 16
Harv. Blackletter L.J. 17,21 (2000).
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introduces the student to fifty corporate employees and asks her to
interview them in order to understand the issues. The facts of a
case, when they are presented, are summarized in neat paragraphs,
easily digested, simplified. Who can blame the first-year associate
for panicking? She's never seen a fact in the wild before. 181
But when Kronman complains that "[m]uch academic legal writing
in America today is marked by a contempt for the claims of practical
wisdom, ' ' 18 he is not suggesting that scholarship or teaching should
actually be practical. In a chapter on law schools of over 100 pages,
Kronman traces the development of different schools of legal
reasoning - beginning with Christopher Columbus Langdell and
encompassing Jerome Frank, Karl Llewellyn, Duncan Kennedy,
Richard Posner and Roberto Unger.'83 Kronman bemoans the
development of the law and economics and critical legal studies
movements on the basis that they undermine a lawyer's conception of
a distinctive legal profession and the practical wisdom of legal
scholarship - leaving only cynicism, distrust and confusion, emotions
that, he argues, have seeped into the profession to the detriment of
society." Yet the notion of clinical training is not mentioned at all-
not even in Kronman's discussion of Jerome Frank, one of the most
well-known and vocal proponents of clinical legal education of the
twentieth century"" and namesake of Yale Law School's own clinic:
"The Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization."
When Kronman talks about practical wisdom, practical scholarship
and professional ethics, he is seemingly blind to the possibility that
exposure to actual practice could achieve or enhance any of these
values among students. When Kronman states, for example, "the
notion that lawyers have distinctive skills and belong to a special
profession is threatened not only by Unger's new critical science of
law, but by every program that seeks to replace traditional forms of
legal understanding with a comprehensive moral theory systematically
built up from elementary philosophical ideas,' ' 86 he is not suggesting
that students practice or even develop many of these distinctive skills.
What Kronman is defending is "a comprehensive moral theory
systematically built up from elementary philosophical ideas."',, It is
safe to assume that a student in Kronman's ideal contracts class will
be spared some of the darker and more complex implications of
181. Stracher, supra note 56, at 50.
182. Kronman, supra note 1, at 271.
183. See id. at 165-271.
184. Id. at 167 ("The critical legal studies movement... [has] exerted an influence
on American law teaching second only to that of law and economics, [and] has also
helped establish the atmosphere of mistrust that now surrounds the virtue of practical
wisdom.").
185. See id. at 185-94.
186. Id. at 264.
187. Id.
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critical legal studies but they will certainly never actually see a
contract, let alone participate in drafting one.'
Edwards has a similar obsession with practical doctrinal scholarship
at the expense of actual practical training. Having lamented the lack
of ethics in the legal profession, the inattention to pro bono
responsibilities, and the poor preparation that legal education
provides for future practitioners, Edwards announces: "My principal
cure for the 'elite' law schools' pedagogy is the same as my cure for
their scholarship. The schools must seek a balance of 'practical' and
'impractical' scholars .... "
Why the focus on scholarship? It is not as if Edwards is unaware
that clinical legal education redresses many of the ills of which he
complains. A former clerk (and current law professor), wrote him:
"'Students need to learn other things [besides doctrine]. It would be
useful, I think, if wanna-be lawyers knew something about
negotiating, trying cases, and working with clients.""" Another
former law clerk (and current practitioner) wrote: ""I know that my
friends who did clinical work knew how to perform basic litigation
tasks... when they graduated.... It's this kind of craftsmanship, as
opposed to substantive knowledge in any particular area of the law,
that turns out to be essential for young litigation associates."',', Yet
another, a current government lawyer, wrote: -[Law school had] a
comprehensive legal justice and clinical program.... In law school, I
saw social justice as a tool for helping people live lives that were less
fettered by injustice and legal obstacles and I still see it that way. '""'
So Edwards's former clerks, all graduates of elite schools, now
performing a variety of legal tasks, think clinics enhance practical
skills, professional responsibility and conceptions of justice. Why
relegate these comments to footnotes, not even granting clinics a
separate heading? Why not "the clinic" rather than "practical
doctrinal scholarship" as the cornerstone of the cure? This is not to
suggest that "practical doctrinal scholarship" is an inadvisable goal
that should not be promoted; nor is it to suggest that practical
scholarship is unrelated to clinical education. If current legal
scholarship promotes contempt for practical wisdom, it makes sense
that clinical training will be treated with contempt. Recognizing that
the issues are intertwined, Kronman could usefully expand his
practical wisdom argument to show how it applies to clinical training
at law schools.
188. For a discussion of the pedagogical benefit of a practical approach, see Edith
R. Warkentine, Kingsfield Doesn't Teach MY Contracts Class: Using Contracts to
Teach Contracts, 50 J. Legal Educ. 112 (2000).
189. Edwards, supra note 2, at 62.
190. Id. at 62 n.78.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 72 n.104.
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Ironically, Kronman's and Edwards's discussions come at a time
when the quality, and especially the quantity, of the legal academy's
scholarship has been the subject of savage criticism. As Schiltz notes:
Rodell wrote, "There are two things wrong with almost all legal
writing. One is its style. The other is its content."... There is a
voluminous and repetitive literature criticizing legal scholarship as
being, among other things, voluminous and repetitive....
[C]ommentators seem to be engaged in a contest to determine who
can come up with the most quotable criticism of modern legal
scholarship. One strong contender for the honor is Michael Paulsen,
who wrote: "If you want to read incomprehensible, pretentious,
pompous, turgid, revolting, jargonistic gibberish, read the law
reviews." Roger Cramton also qualifies for his assertion that
modern legal scholarship consists largely of "interminable and
virtually incoherent metaphysical reinventions of the legal wheel,
combining colossal arrogance with limited understanding." And
Kenneth Lasson deserves some consideration for his entry:
"Scholarship could be valuable; most of it isn't. Whatever rich stew
there might have been thins quickly into gruel through the sheer
multitude of journals seeking fodder for their troughs. Slops fill the
law reviews.' 193
Kronman and Edwards would endorse much of the criticism. It is not
as if they want more, and more useless, theoretical scholarship. I
imagine they want professors to write less often, but on more useful
and practically relevant subjects, 94 a task most often performed,
again, by clinical teachers. So why does Kronman not even give
clinics a mention? It is not as if Kronman and Edwards are actually
against clinical legal education. Kronman has been very supportive of
the Yale Law School clinic during his deanship at Yale, and Edwards
states simply, in his only comment on the issue in the main text of his
article, "[t]hus, I agree that law schools are insufficiently clinical."',9
But the neglect of the topic in their writings is like a deafening silence.
There are two ways to view Kronman's and Edwards's silence on
clinical legal education. The first is to assume that their silence is an
accidental concomitant of being absorbed in the legal education
193. Schiltz, supra note 35, at 789-90 (quoting Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law
Reviews, 23 Va. L. Rev. 38, 38 (1936); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk
and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the
Twenty-Third Century, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 671, 677-78 n. 7 (1995); Roger Cramton,
Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 Geo. L.J. 1, 14 (1986); and Kenneth Lasson,
Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 Harv. L. Rev.
926, 928 (1990)).
194. See Edwards, supra note 2, at 34-37.
195. Id. at 62. It is perhaps misleading to say it is Edwards's only comment. He
does quote a clerk who endorses this approach and he does note that many
commentators have proposed more clinical offerings. See id. at 62 & n.78. He also
states, however, that while not dissenting from the view, he has a different focus. He
never states why his focus is not on clinics. Id. at 62.
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debates of thirty years ago, when clinics were, like moot court, a "side
show" promoted primarily as a skills-enhancing activity."' The
second is to assume that their silence is deliberate. Kronman and
Edwards ignore clinical legal education because it lacks the
prestigious cache required by elite schools to maintain their
dominance. The following and final sections of this article explore
both possibilities, suggesting that the most fundamental flaw in the
approach of Kronman and Edwards is their complete failure to
acknowledge the real history of elite law schools and the most
powerful force behind it: prestige.
C. Beyond Skills Training"9
Any paper which promotes clinical legal education tends to reopen
the debate which has dogged legal education throughout its history:
just what is a law school for? Should a law school develop skills or
scholarship? Should it focus on law or lawyering? A traditional
argument for clinics might refer to the MacCrate Report's lists of
necessary and desirable skills for legal practitioners.'" Of those skills,
very few are covered by the traditional law school curriculum. While
elite law schools claim to enhance analysis, problem solving and
reasoning, they do nothing to promote skills in client counseling,
drafting and negotiating. Others refer to Jerome Franks's famous
statement: "What would we think of a medical school in which
students studied no more than what was to be found in such written or
printed case-histories and were deprived of all clinical experience until
after they received their M.D. degrees?""'
Skills-based arguments, however, are of limited utility. Elite law
schools are not medical schools and elite law graduates are not typical
legal practitioners. Their graduates are not likely to enter into solo
196. See Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on
Clinical Legal Education, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 577. 577 (1987) (comparing law school to
a circus where the theoretical issues are studied in the "'main tent" and practical issues
are merely a "sideshow").
197. Wizner, supra note 115.
198. See Robert MacCrate (chairperson), Legal Education and Professional
Development: An Educational Continuum, 1992 ABA Sec. Legal Educ. & Admission
B. 141-207; see also Robert MacCrate, Educating a Changing Profession: From Clinic
to Continuum, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 1099 (1997). Originally clinicians used skills-based
arguments to justify the presence of clinics in law schools. See, e.g., Steven Wizner and
Dennis Curtis, "Here's What We Do". Some Notes About Clinical Legal Education, 29
Clev. St. L. Rev. 673 (1980). Now clinicians are wary of skills-based arguments, not
only because they view their pedagogical role far more broadly (for the reasons
discussed above) but because law schools can easily replace clinics with more cost-
effective skills-building activities like practice simulations, losing the professional and
personal advantages of live-client clinics. See Genty, supra note 164, at 282-83: Ann
Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 Stan. L Rev. 1731
(1993).
199. Jerome N. Frank, Why Not A Clinical Lawyer-School?. 81 U. Pa. L Rev. 907.
916 (1933).
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practice for the majority of their careers, nor will they necessarily
specialize immediately upon graduation, like doctors moving through
internships, residencies and medical boards. An elite law graduate
may be destined for specialization in a large law firm, a high-level
government position, a teaching position or consultancy at an elite
school, political office or the judicial bench. Many will achieve more
than one of these goals-some all. It may be for this reason that elite
law schools have avoided skills training in favor of taking the best and
brightest students, occupying their minds for three years with
scholarship and problem solving, and assuming that they possess the
intelligence, analytical skills and intellectual rigor to absorb the
information necessary to succeed in their chosen career paths. The
technique appears to have been a success. Elite law schools have met
with no opposition from the legal profession and their graduates
continue to be highly sought after, considerably more so than
graduates of lower tier schools that concentrate on developing
practical legal skills.
But another, more sinister, reason can be suggested for the elite
legal profession's apparent acquiescence in the traditional methods of
legal training. By taking students from elite law schools, the elite
sector of the profession populates itself with people of the right
pedigree and background. Thus the profession cares little whether
students have developed practical skills or dirtied their hands with
clients in clinics, provided they have the socio-economic prerequisites
and, ideally, the connections to associate with elite clients. There is
certainly ample evidence to suggest that the evolution of elite legal
education, from the apprentice system of Tapping Reeve and the
textbook teaching style of Theodore Dwight, to the case method of
Christopher Langdell and the James Barr Ames model of a full-time
academic teacher, was as much based on who the academy wanted to
keep out as on enhancing the skills of those it wanted to keep in."
D. Nostalgia
Kronman and Edwards have been accused of falling into the trap of
legal nostalgia-harking back to a non-existent golden age when men
were men, lawyers were men, and lawyers were statesmen. Hanna
Holborn Grey has commented:
The language of educational criticism.., is most often that of
longing. The rhetoric of concern about higher education stands as a
surrogate for talking about a confusing and always changing world,
200. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in
Modern America 102-29 (1976); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism In The
Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts At Resuscitation, And Alternate Sources Of
Virtue, 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 305, 306-08 (2000); Alfred S.
Konefsky & John Henry Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror On The Wall: Histories Of
American Law Schools, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 833, 844 (1982).
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of sketching out the ideals of a better, more coherent, and once-
stable universe. Yearning for the idyllic way things were when one
went to college, the wish that the place would never change, the fear
that it has done so; all this represents a common form of expressing
distress and disillusion with a threatening, uncertain, and mystifying
world that now challenges cherished beliefs and once-secure
anchors, one that threatens to repudiate the clarities and simplicities
of a better time.... 201
While most legal education scholars endorse the lawyer-statesman
ideal, many dispute that a golden time of good ethics, statesmanship
and commitment to public good ever existed. Galanter argues:
That a much higher proportion of lawyers (or elite lawyers) were
engaged in disinterested public service in the good old days seems
highly unlikely. A sense of professional obligation to provide legal
services pro bono publico is far more evident today than it was
during Professor Glendon's Golden Age. As one 1940 graduate,
looking back on changes in the profession, observed: "During my
law school days I cannot remember ever hearing the words 'pro
bono' or any reference to a professional obligation to give free
public service.
°202
To Galanter the legal profession has not undergone so much a
change in standards as one in honest exposure:
One reason such comparisons are difficult is that information about
law practice in the Golden Age was much more restricted than in
the present period. In the late 1970s, there was a sudden and
dramatic expansion in the availability of information about law
practice. With the growth of a more intrusive and candid legal
journalism, more ample directories, and more penetrating scholarly
research, information about the earnings, fees, clients, internal
politics, and business strategies of law firms became accessible
beyond a narrow circle of insiders.... So it is difficult to distinguish
how much has changed in what lawyers are doing and how much in
what Steve Brill is making us unable to ignore.- '
Others suggest that the ethical and statesman-like qualities to which
Kronman refers are concepts loaded with implicit elitist assumptions
about the status of women, ethnic minorities and the working classes.
Nuanced histories on the development of "standards" and "ethics" in
the legal profession disclose that concepts like "quality" and "ethics"
were used in an attempt to keep women, Jews, blacks and other
"undesirables" out of the legal profession.2w Law schools which
201. Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100
Dick. L. Rev. 549, 552 (1996) (quoting Hanna Holborn Gray, The Leaning Tower of
Acadene, 49 Bull. Am. Acad. Arts & Sci. 34, 35-36 (1996)).
202. Id- at 559.
203. Id. at 558 (citations omitted).
204. See Auerbach, supra note 200, at 102-29; Robert Stevens, Two Cheers for
1870: The American Law School 463-64 (1971); Konefsky & Schlegel, supra note 200,
2001]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
catered to those traditionally denied an elite law school education-
night schools and those which opened their doors to women and
ethnic minorities-were ruthlessly denigrated by elite law schools
intent on their demise. °5 While the sexism, racism and class bias of
the elite schools was often blatant, the banner that they fought under
was often labeled "ethics" and to some the banner is still marked with
its historical stain.0 6
Kronman counters these arguments by begging the reader not to
throw the baby out with the bath water. He admits that many lawyers
fell short of their stated ideals:
The profession's past had its shameful aspects too, including, most
obviously, its racial, religious, and sexual exclusivity. But these
failings are so striking, and our sense of rectitude in having
overcome them so intense, that we lose sight of what was better in
its past and fail to notice how impoverished the ideals of American
lawyers have become.2°
Kronman's analysis raises an intriguing issue-to what extent are the
ideals to which he refers inherently exclusive? To what extent can the
shameful aspects of their formation be separated from their content,
and to what extent are they one and the same? °0 Many would argue
that the death of the lawyer-statesman ideal is an inevitable
concomitant of the demise of the exclusivity of the legal profession. °9
It might seem the height of prejudice to assume that women and
ethnic minorities inevitably bring ethical decline, but some see the
onset of aggressive competition within the legal profession so
lamented by Kronman as actually desirable. Silver and Cross argue
that the changes are desirable for the client:
The changes that occurred during the middle of the twentieth
century made legal services easier to find because they forced
lawyers to serve clients more economically. This made life harder
at 844.
205. See, e.g., Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Impact of History on
Contemporary Prestige Images of Boston's Law Schools, 24 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 621
(1990).
206. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Practical Wisdom For Practicing Lawyers:
Separating Ideals From Ideology In Legal Ethics, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 458, 464 (1994)
(reviewing Kronman, supra note 1) ("Yet as many commentators have documented.
these lawyers routinely deployed arguments about the importance of maintaining
professional ideals as a means of excluding women and minorities, erecting
protectionist barriers to competition from laymen, and shielding incompetent
colleagues from public sanction." (citations omitted)).
207. Kronman, supra note 1, at 5.
208. Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?,
in Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in the American Legal
Profession 230, 235 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) ("It is important to take full
account, not only of the failure of professionals to live up to their ideals, but of the
extent to which the ideals themselves have been bound up with the rationalization of
hierarchy inside and outside the profession.").
209. Cochran, supra note 200, at 308-11.
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for lawyers, but it made clients happier. And is not making clients
happy, in the main, what professionalism is about? Anticompetitive
regulations may have boosted lawyers' earnings and morale and
enabled them to be more statesman-like and less service-minded
than lawyers are today, but only a person with a lawyer-centric view
of the world would find these compelling reasons to mourn the
past.210
Others point to the advantages for lawyers who fall outside the
traditional elites. Jill Conway, an Australian author, tells of her initial
horror when she discovered competitive students from Harvard Law
School hiding legal texts in the library: "It took me some time to
understand that my ideas about fair play came from a smallish society
with tiny and fairly stable elites, for whom the prizes of success were
reasonably predictable. '211 After all, for all its excess, the dictatorial
regime of billable hours has all the hallmarks of a predictable and
egalitarian meritocracy. Firms still discriminate in hiring minorities,
and a focus on long hours hampers women with familial
responsibilities. But for those who are willing and able to invest the
hours and generate revenue, many minorities are well aware that their
chances of success and partnership are far greater than they ever
would have been if promotion were based on the assessment of a
small group of men, all with similar schooling and background,
judging against their perceived standard of the great "lawyer-
statesman." Perhaps it is for this reason that Galanter has "the
impression that some sections of the American legal world-women
and minority lawyers, plaintiffs' lawyers, ADR practitioners, law and
economics types, feminist legal theorists, to mention just a few-are
less susceptible to the charms of the good old days." '
CONCLUSION: PRESTIGE
The principal obstacle to the embrace of clinical legal education is
not a misunderstanding of its role as a purely skills-enhancing activity
but the fact that it does not enhance the major factor that has shaped
elite law schools throughout their history-a competitive advantage
borne of academic prestige. This is a complex problem that goes
beyond the pure snobbery that some have alleged.21" As one of
Edwards's clerks aptly summed up:
[Clinics] are the things that law schools do poorly: partly they don't
want to spend the money (clinicals are expensive); partly the current
210. Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1477 (citations omitted).
211. Jill Ker Conway, True North 22 (1994).
212. Galanter, supra note 201, at 561 n.52.
213. Falcon, supra note 46, at 161 ("[T]he more reputable the law school, the more
likely its clinics will be of low quality. Prestigious schools tend to think that anything
having to do with the real world, as part of the curriculum, is beneath that school's
dignity.").
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law school faculty don't have these skills; and partly it is hard to
know how to integrate clinical teachers (who often don't publish)
with the standard academic hiring and promotion process.214
Kronman and Edwards can be accused of falling into the same trap as
those whom they criticize. Schiltz remarks:
Unfortunately, though, I have found that, in one important respect,
lawyers and law professors have more in common than they might
like to admit. Put charitably, the professional lives of both are
increasingly focused on one narrow purpose. Put less charitably, the
professional lives of both are increasingly dominated by greed. For
lawyers, it is greed for money; for law professors, it is greed for
215academic prestige.
Kronman and Edwards, and elite law students, are in an elitist
double bind. There are many law schools that teach innovatively and
win prizes for their efforts. Many schools place great emphasis on
quality legal writing. Many devote a great deal of resources to clinics,
externships and internships for credit. Many law schools have
professors with a great deal of practical experience who engage in
valuable practical and doctrinal scholarship. Many have caring
professors and gender and ethnic diversity. Kronman could be dean
of one, Edwards could hire clerks from such schools, and the best
students could attend them-but they are just not elite schools.
Students want to be at elite schools and they want the opportunities
only available to those at elite schools-and elite schools are
determined by the scholarship and pedigree of their faculties.
Clinics provide a partial way out of this trap. Already ensconced in
elite law schools, they allow for elite professors to pursue the
scholarship that determines their career and the prestige of their law
school. Clinics allow the best law students to attend elite schools, and
avail themselves of the increased opportunities afforded by these
214. Edwards, supra note 2, at 62 n.78. The expense of clinics as an obstacle should
not be underestimated. Rhode writes:
For many law school and central university administrators, public-service
initiatives seem less pressing than other budget items more directly linked to
daily needs and national reputations. For example, U.S. News & World
Report rankings of law schools have become increasingly important. Not
only are pro bono opportunities excluded from the factors that determine a
school's rank, they compete for resources with programs that do affect its
position.
Rhode, supra note 38, at 2440 (citations omitted).
The primary attraction of law schools to university administrators is that they
can charge high tuition to students without incurring the equipment costs of schools of
science and medicine. Furthermore, the classic elite school teaching style using the
Socratic case method allows for a high student/faculty ratio. Even the full-time
academic model is advantageous- lawyers leaving practice are inevitably going to
expect salary parity with their previous professions.
215. Schiltz, supra note 35, at 706.
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schools, without turning their back on the qualities that enhance the
lawyer-statesman ideal.
But if clinics as they currently exist at elite law schools were a
complete solution, then Kronman and Edwards would have nothing to
write about. A great deal more needs to be done. Clinics need to be
moved from the sideshow to the big top of elite legal education.
Clinics need more money so that more students can move into clinics
without losing the value of mentoring and the warm personal
relationships engendered by a low faculty-student ratio. The policy of
imposing credit limits on clinical activities should be questioned, and
the possibility of making pro bono work compulsory should at least be
explored. Other obstacles to the full integration of clinics include the
secondary status of clinical professors, the separate location of many
law school clinics, and the inability of clinical professors to vote on
faculty and tenure decisions.
These practical matters, however, are insignificant compared to the
need for clinical legal education to be recognized and celebrated by
the leading figures of elite education-people like Dean Kronman and
Judge Edwards. Clinical Professor Steven Wizner once said of Dean
Kronman: "[T]he greatest thing he ever did for the [Yale] clinic was
to leave it alone. '216 This may have once been true, but the time has
now come to shout from the rooftops about the contribution of
clinical education to the lawyer-statesman ideal. Only with high-
profile champions can clinical legal education hope to obtain the
prestige necessary for true integration. Of course, for an elite law
school dean to fully champion clinical education is to take an
enormous leap, risking both money and status, but then again no one
says it better than Kronman himself:
The capacity to resist these pressures is in part a matter of courage.
A courageous lawyer is prepared to take risks for what he or she
believes is right-to risk anger, contempt, and a lower income for
the sake of the law's own good-and nothing can be a substitute for
the fortitude this requires. 217
216. Interview with Professor Stephen Wizner (Aug. 18. 2000): see also Laura G.
Holland, Invading the Ivor, Tower: The History of Clinical Education at Yale Law
School, 49 J. Legal Educ. 504, 533 (1999).
217. Kronman, supra note 1, at 145.
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